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Background 
Floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) units have long been employed in the 
North Sea, with the introduction of the first purpose built FPSO, Petrojarl 1, in 1986. Since 
then, the prevalence in the use of FPSO units in the North Sea has gradually been increasing.  
Tandem configuration is the most common way of performing offloading operations from an 
FPSO. Such a configuration involves the tanker positioning itself at some distance behind the 
FPSO, and the two vessels connect by a mooring hawser and a cargo hose used for offloading 
(Chen and Moan, 2004). The shuttle tanker maintains its position using dynamic positioning 
(DP), keeping the mooring hawser free of tension, or by applying a small thrust astern, 
keeping the mooring hawser is tensioned.(Chen and Moan, 2005).  
Historically there have been several collisions and near misses involving shuttle tankers and 
FPSOs in tandem offloading operations. Due to the large masses of the FPSO and shuttle 
tanker, and thus large potential impact energy, any collision involves a high risk. As it is 
found that offshore risk analyses traditionally have been focused on technical factors, often 
neglecting human factors, this thesis will focus on risks related to human and organisational 
factors (HOF) and their interaction with technical factors 
 
Master thesis – objective and tasks 
The overall objective of this master thesis is to investigate the current situation for risks 
relating to collisions between shuttle tankers and FPSOs during tandem offloading in the 
North Sea. More specifically, it investigates the HOF and technical risk factors considering a 
drive-off scenario where the shuttle tanker has a powered forward motion. It is intended to 
provide an overview of the previous research that has been done in the field and investigate 
what has been done in the decade following the conclusion of the first research projects in the 
early 2000’s. Further, it is the students’s intention to present updated frequencies for incidents 
and collisions involving DP shuttle tankers performing tandem offloading from FPSO, as well 
as to try identifying possible measures for significantly reducing the collision risk. 
In the work, the student will perform extensive literature research as well as data collection 
from available sources. This includes obtaining feedback from people involved in the 
previously performed research as well as obtaining feedback from people working in the 
industry. Overall, the thesis investigates four aspects of tandem offloading operations and 
seeks to answer the following questions: 
NTNU  Trondheim 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
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1) Literature study of the research on collision risk between FPSO and shuttle tanker 
during tandem offloading in the North Sea (i.e. the entire UK and Norwegian 
continental shelves).  
a. Pre year 2003. 
i. What were the major studies performed? 
ii. What were their findings and conclusions? 
b. Post year 2003. 
i. What are the major studies performed? 
ii. What are their findings and conclusions? 
2) What are the risks involved in FPSO and shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations 
in the North Sea? 
a. What are the main technical risks involved? Describe technical equipment 
employed. 
b. What are the main human and organisational risks involved? Describe 
procedures for performing operations and training of personnel. 
3) Which barriers are employed to mitigate the collision risk on shuttle tankers and 
FPSOs? 
a. Technical 
b. Human and organisational 
4) What is the current situation in relation to the collision risk anno mid 2014? 
a. Have the number of incidents/accidents been reduced? 
b. Present updated frequencies for DP shuttle tankers. 
c. Has there been technical progress in the equipment employed during 
offloading operations? 
5) How can the collision risk be significantly reduced? 
a. Are there possible technical measures for reducing the risk that have not been 
employed? 
b. Are there unresolved human and/or organisational risks that still need to be 
addressed? 
Deadline: 10.06.2014 
Supervision: 
Responsible supervisor at NTNU: Prof. Jan Erik Vinnem 
     Phone: 911 52 125 
     E-mail: jan.erik.vinnem@ntnu.no 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Following a series of collisions and near-misses, involving shuttle tanker and FPSO performing 
tandem offloading operations in the North Sea, extensive effort was put to address the issue in 
the early 2000’s. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the current situation for risks relating 
to collisions between DP shuttle tanker and FPSO during tandem offloading operations in the 
North Sea. The main research question was ‘what major research has been performed on the 
collision risk between DP shuttle tanker and FPSO during tandem offloading in the North Sea, 
and what is the current situation of the collision risk, anno mid 2014?’  
An extensive literature study was performed, featuring background material concerning FPSOs, 
shuttle tankers, and tandem offloading operations. The collision risk was further investigated 
by using both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis methods. The qualitative risk analysis 
included an assessment of human, organisational, and technical factors’ influence in tandem 
offloading operations. Based on the aforementioned, a simple analysis of barriers against 
collision in a drive-off scenario was performed using the bow-tie method. The quantitative risk 
analysis included a statistical data analysis of reported incidents involving DP shuttle tankers 
performing tandem offloading from FPSOs on the UK and Norwegian continental shelves 
(UKCS & NCS), covering the time period from 1995-2013. The results from the risk analysis 
were further applied to propose possible risk mitigation measures for tandem offloading 
operations between DP shuttle tanker and FPSO. 
Research relating to the collision risk in FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading operations, performed 
post the conclusion of the JIP project ‘Operational Safety of FPSOs’,  is found to be mainly 
concerned with further work regarding the risk elements that were identified in the JIP project 
and the PhD thesis of Dr. Ing. Haibo Chen, as well as providing updated statistics on incidents 
and risk levels. 
Results from this thesis’ risk analysis revealed a decrease in the frequency (both absolute and 
per offloading) of incidents and collisions, during FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading operations 
on the UKCS & NCS, when comparing 1995-2003 versus 2004-2013. For the UKCS & NCS 
aggregated, per mid-2014, the collision frequency estimated to lie in the range of 4.5E-04 to 
8.0E-04 per offloading, and the drive-off frequency is estimated to lie in the range of 9.0E-04 
to 2.3E-03 per offloading. 
iv 
Several measures for reducing the collision frequency have been proposed and discussed in this 
thesis. The measures addresses DPO competence level, time available for initiating recovery 
action, cooperation between shuttle tanker and FPSO, and alternative field configurations. The 
collision frequency can be significantly reduced by applying direct offloading configuration 
instead of tandem offloading configuration. However, there are technical and operational issues 
that have to be resolved, before applying such a configuration to ship-shaped FPSOs
v 
SAMMENDRAG 
Etter en rekke kollisjoner og nesten-kollisjoner under tandem losseoperasjoner mellom 
bøyelaster og FPSO i Nordsjøen, ble det på begynnelsen av 2000-tallet lagt ned stor innsats for 
å adressere problemet. Formålet med denne avhandlingen er å undersøke den nåværende 
situasjonen i forhold til risiko relatert til kollisjoner mellom DP bøyelaster og FPSO under 
tandem losseoperasjoner i Nordsjøen. Hovedproblemstillingen var ‘hvilke større 
forskningsprosjekter har blitt gjennomført i forhold til kollisjonsrisikoen mellom DP bøyelaster 
og FPSO under tandem losseoperasjoner i Nordsjøen, og hva er den nåværende situasjonen for 
kollisjonsrisikoen, anno midten av 2014?’ 
Det ble gjennomført et omfattende litteraturstudie, som inkluderte bakgrunnsmateriale om 
FPSO, bøyelaster og tandem losseoperasjoner. Kollisjonsrisikoen ble videre undersøkt ved bruk 
av både kvalitative og kvantitative risikoanalytiske metoder. Den kvalitative risikoanalysen 
omfattet en vurdering av menneskelige, tekniske og organisatoriske faktorers innflytelse på 
tandem losseoperasjoner. På grunnlag av det overnevnte, ble det utført en enkel analyse av 
barrierer mot kollisjon i «drive-off» scenarier ved hjelp av bow-tie metoden. Den kvantitative 
risikoanalysen inkluderte en statistisk analyse av rapporterte hendelser med DP bøyelastere som 
utfører tandem lossing fra FPSO på britisk og norsk sokkel (UKCS & NCS). Analysen dekker 
perioden 1995-2013. Resultatene fra risikoanalysen ble videre brukt til å foreslå mulige 
risikoreduserende tiltak for tandem losseoperasjoner mellom DP bøyelaster og FPSO. 
Det viser seg at forskningen som har blitt gjennomført på kollisjonsrisikoen under FPSO-
bøyelaster losseoperasjoner, i etterkant av det felles industriprosjektet ‘Operational Safety of 
FPSOs’, hovedsakelig omhandler videre arbeid med risikoelementene som ble identifisert i 
industriprosjektet og doktorgradsavhandlingen til Dr. Ing. Haibo Chen, samt oppdatering av 
statistikk om hendelser og risikonivåer. 
Resultater fra denne avhandlingens analyser avdekket en nedgang i frekvensen (absolutt og per 
losseoperasjon) av hendelser og kollisjoner under FPSO-bøyelaster losseoperasjoner på norsk 
og britisk sokkel, for perioden 2004-2013, sammenlignet med perioden 1995-2003. 
Kollisjonsfrekvensen for norsk og britisk sokkel samlet, anno midten av 2014, estimeres å ligge 
i området 4.5E-04 til 8.0E-04 per losseoperasjon, og «drive-off» -frekvensen estimeres å ligge 
i området 9.0E-04 to 2.3E-03 per losseoperasjon. 
vi 
Flere tiltak for å redusere kollisjonsfrekvensen har blitt foreslått og diskutert i denne 
avhandlingen. Tiltakene adresserer DP operatørs kompetansenivå, tilgjengelig tid for å 
iverksette handling for å unngå kollisjon, samarbeid mellom bøyelaster og FPSO, samt 
alternative feltkonfigurasjoner. Kollisjonsfrekvensen kan reduseres betydelig ved å bruke 
«direct offloading» konfigurasjon i stedet for tandem konfigurasjon. Det er imidlertid tekniske 
og operasjonelle problemer som må løses før man kan bruke en slik konfigurasjon på en 
skipsformet FPSO.
vii 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) units have been used in the North Sea since 
1980`s, with the introduction of the first purpose built FPSO, Petrojarl 1, in 1986. Since then, 
the prevalence in the use of FPSO units in the North Sea has gradually increased. In total, there 
are currently (per May 2014) 29 FPSOs operating in the North Sea.   
In literature, floating, production, storage and offloading unit is a common term used to 
describe a marine vessel designed to permit direct production, storage, and offloading of 
process fluids from subsea installations. The term floating structure implies that that the full 
weight of the structure is supported by buoyancy, which includes weight of the mooring system, 
riser system, operational equipment and lightship weight (Paik and Thayamballi, 2007). It 
further implies that the unit can be relocated, although it is normally stationed at a location for 
extended periods of time. FPSOs are commonly ship-shaped units having a submerged, internal 
or external turret mooring system (NTS, 2013). The operational principle of a FPSO turret 
mooring system is that the hull of the FPSO rotates around the turret, positioning the hull 
according to the dominant weather conditions. The rotation can be either active or passive.  
Unless stated otherwise in this thesis, the term FPSO is used to describe ship-shaped FPSO 
units. Further, since the offloading operations for a ship-shaped FPSO are similar to a ship-
shaped floating storage unit (FSU), the term FPSO is applied to cover both FPSO and FSU 
units, in order to enhance the thesis’ readability. FSU units are generally ship-shaped marine 
vessels designed for storage of crude oil or condensate (NTS, 2013), i.e. FSU units do not have 
capabilities for oil processing. 
FPSOs in the North Sea mostly rely on the use of shuttle tankers for offloading of their cargo 
oil. The term shuttle tanker is used to describe a trading tanker traveling back and forth between 
a shore terminal and a FPSO or FSU, transporting oil ashore. Furthermore, tandem 
configuration is the most common way of performing offloading operations from an FPSO. 
Such a configuration involves the tanker positioning itself at some distance behind the FPSO, 
and the two vessels connect by a mooring hawser and a cargo hose used for offloading (Chen 
and Moan, 2004). The shuttle tanker maintains its position using dynamic positioning (DP), 
keeping the mooring hawser free of tension, or by applying a small thrust astern, keeping the 
mooring hawser tensioned (Chen and Moan, 2005).  
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1.1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND RELATION TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Historically, there have been several collisions and near-miss incidents, involving shuttle 
tankers and FPSOs performing tandem offloading operations in the North Sea. Due to the large 
masses of the FPSO and shuttle tanker, and thus large potential impact energy, any collision 
involves a high risk. As it was found that offshore risk analyses traditionally had been focused 
on technical factors, often neglecting human factors, effort was put address this research gap in 
the early 2000’s. 
From 1996 to 2002, the research project ‘Operational Safety of FPSOs’ was performed by 
NTNU and SINTEF, on the behalf of two major oil companies and the Health and Safety 
Executive UK (HSE). The overall objective of the project was to develop risk assessment 
methodologies for FPSOs. In the second part of the project (2000-2002), the risk assessments 
methodologies developed in the project’s first phase (1996-2000) were used to analyse the 
collision risk between FPSOs and shuttle tankers during off-loading operations, mainly 
focusing on contributions from human and organisational factors (HOFs). Two summarizing 
reports were issued, (Vinnem, 2000) and (Vinnem et al., 2003b). 
In parallel with the aforementioned research project, Dr. Ing. Haibo Chen performed his PhD 
study ‘Probabilistic evaluation of FPSO-tanker collision in tandem offloading operation’. 
(Chen, 2003) addresses the collision risk by separately investigating the initiating stage and the 
recovery stage of potential collision scenarios. 
This thesis will succeed the aforementioned studies, providing an up to date assessment of the 
risk in FPSO-shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations in the North Sea. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate the current situation for risks relating to 
collisions between DP shuttle tankers and FPSOs during tandem offloading operations in the 
North Sea. More specifically, it investigates HOFs and technical risk factors considering a 
drive-off scenario where the shuttle tanker has a powered forward motion. This thesis uses the 
definition of (Chen, 2003, p.11) for DP shuttle tanker drive-off events, i.e. an event where the 
DP shuttle tanker “is driven away from its targeted/wanted position by its own thrusters in 
offloading operation. This is not a planned or wanted event”.  
This thesis is intended to provide an overview of the previous research that has been done in 
the field and investigate what has been done in the decade following the conclusion of the first 
research projects in the early 2000’s. Further, it is the author’s intention to present updated 
frequencies for incidents and collisions involving DP shuttle tankers performing tandem 
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offloading from FPSO, as well as to try identifying possible measures for significantly reducing 
the collision risk. The main research question of this thesis is ‘what major research has been 
performed on the collision risk between DP shuttle tanker and FPSO during tandem offloading 
in the North Sea, and what is the current situation of the collision risk anno mid 2014?’ In order 
to answer this, the thesis investigates four aspects of tandem offloading operations and seeks to 
answer the following sub questions: 
1) What are the major studies performed on the collision risk between FPSO and shuttle 
tanker during tandem offloading in the North Sea (i.e. the entire UK and Norwegian 
continental shelves)? 
2) What are the main risks involved in FPSO – shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations 
in the North Sea? 
3) Which barriers are employed to mitigate the collision risk on shuttle tankers and FPSOs? 
4) What is the current situation in relation to the collision risk anno mid 2014? 
5) How can the collision risk be significantly reduced? 
1.3 LIMITATIONS 
There are some limitations to the work performed worth mentioning. This focus of this thesis 
is limited to the main systems and on-board equipment, as well as the personnel, directly 
involved in FPSO – DP shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations. This includes both vessels’ 
crew and operating organisations. Thus, it does not consider the impact of other systems that 
may be operated simultaneously aboard the vessel, nor does it consider other offloading 
methods e.g. parallel offloading. Moreover, only DP operated shuttle tankers are considered, 
thus other field configurations, e.g. ‘taut hawser’, are not considered. More specifically, it 
considers an offloading system comprising of the DP shuttle tanker and the FPSO during all 
offloading phases, and the offloading arrangements. However, as the offloading phase has been 
shown to be the most vulnerable phase in relation to collision risk, the thesis does not explicitly 
consider the other phases of tandem offloading operations.  
This thesis’s risk assessment is intended to be a coarse risk assessment, implying that field 
specific configurations and characteristics are not investigated in detail. Moreover, 
consequences of collisions are not considered, only the frequencies. Hence, the proposed 
measures are aimed at reducing the frequencies and not consequences. Further, this thesis does 
not address the acceptability of the present levels of collision risk between FPSO and shuttle 
tanker. 
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The statistical analysis of incidents presented in this thesis only includes operations from 
01.01.1995 to 31.12.2013, and results do not refer to any specific shuttle tanker operator, nor 
to tandem offloading operations from any particular FPSO/FSU field. Moreover, the results are 
obtained by aggregating incidents from several shuttle tankers performing tandem offloading 
from multiple FPSO/FSU fields on the UKCS & NCS. Hence, the frequencies should be 
regarded as representative estimates for North Sea tandem offloading operations.  
1.4 STRUCTURE 
The report consists of five parts: 
1. Background material on FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading operations. 
2. Theory and methods. 
3. Analysis of FPSO-shuttle tanker collision risk. 
4. Results from statistical analysis. 
5. Discussion and conclusions. 
Chapter 2 presents background material concerning FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading 
operations, the vessels and technical equipment. This part focuses on issues specific for tandem 
offloading operations between DP shuttle tanker and FPSO, describing the vessels, equipment, 
and operational considerations. 
Chapter 3 presents the theory and methods applied in this thesis. The main focus here is on 
risk assessment and HOFs. 
Chapter 4 presents the main part of this thesis, the risk analysis of FPSO-DP shuttle tanker 
tandem offloading operations in the North Sea. It provides a description of the risks involved 
in such operations and research performed previously on the subject. Further, it describes the 
thesis’ qualitative and quantitative risk analysis, covering HOF aspects, barriers, and statistical 
data on incidents and collisions. 
Chapter 5 presents the results from the risk analysis described in chapter 4. It consists of two 
main parts, one covering the overall incident frequencies, and one part covering the collision 
frequency. 
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of this thesis’ results and methods, as well as possible measures 
for reducing the collision frequency.  
Chapter 7 presents this thesis’ conclusions and recommendations for further work relating to 
this thesis’ research. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
In order to facilitate a better understanding of the risks involved when performing tandem 
offloading operations in the North Sea, it is first necessary to introduce the basics of such 
operations, as well as the vessels involved. This chapter introduces FPSO units and shuttle 
tankers, before presenting the main concepts and issues related to performing tandem offloading 
between such vessels, i.e. configurations, station-keeping, DP system and training of personnel. 
Additional information is also presented in appendixes A2, A3, A4. 
2.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO FPSO UNITS 
FPSOs offers the possibility to fulfil several functions using only one offshore unit, i.e. 
production, storage and offloading, alongside the possibility of exporting the product onshore 
using shuttle tankers. Thus, FPSOs remove the necessity of an export pipeline infrastructure, 
only requiring a riser and mooring system to bring the product to the surface. Consequently, 
FPSOs have become recognized as one of the most economical alternatives for deep- and 
ultradeep-sea field developments, as the building cost of fixed platforms outweigh the 
investment and operational cost for FPSOs on such depths. FPSOs have also become popular 
for marginal field developments due to the possibility of relocating the FPSO (Paik and 
Thayamballi, 2007). Figure 1 shows a FPSO and associated equipment used in operations at a 
subsea oil field development, as well as offloading to a shuttle tanker in tandem configuration.  
 
Figure 1: FPSO and shuttle tanker in tandem offloading (OET, 2014). 
The FPSO is moored by several mooring chain wires, stretching from the turret, down to the 
seabed. The risers from the subsea production system are also connected to the turret, sending 
hydrocarbons up to the FPSO for topsides processing. The topsides have accommodation 
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spaces and a heli deck for transporting personnel to/from the FPSO. Further, the topsides 
include processing facilities, a flare tower for burning off raw natural gas (gas flaring) that is 
unusable, and an offloading arrangement in the stern area. The processed hydrocarbon 
product is stored in large storage tanks in the hull of the FPSO, before being offloaded to a 
shuttle tanker at regular intervals. FPSOs in the North Sea typically have a length of 200-280 
m, a width of 30-50 m, a moulded depth of 20-30 m, and a storage capacity of 600,000-
900,000 bbl.  
2.2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO SHUTTLE TANKERS 
There are two applicable methods for exporting hydrocarbon products ashore from offshore 
installations: using shuttle tankers or using an export pipeline system. A shuttle tanker is a ship 
specifically designed for such transport purposes, often providing the more feasible export 
alternative in remote locations, deep waters and harsh environmental conditions. Shuttle tankers 
were first introduced in the North Sea during the 1970’s, and have since become common in all 
parts of the world. DP shuttle tankers distinct themselves from regular crude oil tankers, being 
capable of operating independently in all environmental conditions. The vessels’ outfitting 
includes a dynamic positioning (DP) system1 for position keeping, and several thrusters located 
in the bow and stern. Low speed manoeuvrability is ensured by flap rudders and controllable 
pitch propellers (RIGZONE, 2014). Due to their superior seaworthiness, DP shuttle tankers are 
widely applied in the North Sea (Chen and Moan, 2002). Shuttle tankers performing tandem 
offloading are equipped with a loading system in the bow section of the vessel. A typical shuttle 
tanker on the NCS has a loading capacity of 900 000 bbl or approximately 120 000 tonnes oil 
(NOROG, 2011).  
2.3 FPSO – SHUTTLE TANKER TANDEM OFFLOADING OPERATIONS 
In tandem offloading operations from FPSO to shuttle tanker, the shuttle tanker is positioned at 
some distance behind the FPSO, with its bow facing the stern of the FPSO. An illustration of 
the tandem offloading concept is provided in Figure 2. Cargo is transferred from the FPSO via 
a flexible pipe, a transfer hose, stretching between the stern of the FPSO and the bow of the 
shuttle tanker. In order to protect the integrity hose, it is necessary to limit the relative 
movements of the two vessels. This is achieved using a flexible polyester cable, a hawser, which 
provides a passive mooring between the vessels (Wilkerson and Nagarajaiah, 2009). 
                                               
1 The DP system is further outlined in Section 2.4. 
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Figure 2: Tandem offloading operation, FPSO and DP shuttle tanker (Chen, 2003). 
A tandem offloading operation can be divided into three main operation phases (Chen, 2003, 
Vinnem et al., 2003b, Chen and Moan, 2002): 
1) Approach and connection: The shuttle tanker approaches the stern of the FPSO/FSU, 
stops at a predetermined distance, before connecting the messenger line, loading hose 
and hawser. 
2) Offloading: The hydrocarbon product is transferred from the FPSO/FSU to the shuttle 
tanker. 
3) Disconnection and departure: Upon completion of the offloading, before disconnection 
of the loading hose and hawser, the manifold is flushed. The hawser and loading hose 
is then sent back to the FPSO/FSU, whilst the shuttle tanker backs up, away from the 
FPSO/FSU stern. 
The frequency of offloading operations is dependent on the production rate, the FPSO/FSU 
storage capacity, and the shuttle tanker size. Typically, it lies in the range of once every 3 to 5 
days, the offloading operation having a duration of approximately 20 hours (Chen and Moan, 
2002). An example of the process for a tandem offloading operation in the North Sea is 
included in appendix A3. 
2.3.1 Field configurations 
Tandem offloading systems comprise a combination of customised and off-the-shelf systems. 
As shown in Table 1, which contains some of the key characteristics for avoiding collisions 
between shuttle tanker and FPSO/FSU, the variety of characteristics in FPSO/FSU field 
configurations are multiple.  
A FPSO is commonly custom-made for operating on a specific field, i.e. the FPSO’s design 
and equipment is custom-made to suit the particular operational requirements and needs of that 
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particular field. In areas where the environmental conditions are not very demanding, yielding 
less challenging conditions for offloading, the FPSOs tend to be converted commercial tankers. 
In the North Sea, the challenging environmental conditions have however made custom-made 
FPSOs the more common type of FPSO. There are also considerable variations between system 
configurations for offloading (Vinnem et al., 2003b). Shuttle tankers are normally not purpose 
built for operations on specific fields, however their outfitting largely determines which type of 
services they are appropriate for (Vinnem, 2013a).  
Table 1: FPSO/FSU field configuration variations (Vinnem, 2013a). 
Characteristic Variations 
FPSO station-keeping capabilities Internal turret with 8-12 point mooring system 
FPSO heading-keeping capabilities Without heading control 
With heading control 
ST heading and station-keeping capabilities No propulsion 
Main propulsion (single or twin screw) 
No DP system 
DP1, DP2 or DP3 systems 
Offloading mode DP operated 
Taut hawser operated 
Interface systems With hawser connection 
Without hawser connection 
Distance FPSO – ST  50-100 [m] 
80 [m] 
150 [m] (currently not in use) 
 
The distance between FPSO and shuttle tanker during offloading operations in the North Sea 
varies from 50-110 m, the more common distance being in the range of 70-80 m. According 
to (Vinnem et al., 2003b),  the distance lies in the range of 50 m up to 75-80 m for fields on 
the UKCS. On the NCS, the distance is stated to be in the range from 75-80 m up to 100-
110m. 
(Paik and Thayamballi, 2007) states that the use of DP systems in FPSO shuttle tanker 
operations can help fulfilling station-keeping requirements, disconnection limits, and contribute 
to maintaining production uptime in bad weather. However, (Helgøy, 2003) states that from a 
DP point of view, tandem offloading configuration is the most demanding offloading system, 
due to surge and fishtailing movements of the FPSO/FSU being especially challenging in 
tandem offloading operations. Still, it has become the most popular solution for offshore 
2. Background 
9 
offloading in the North Sea. Tandem offloading from FPSO/FSU to DP shuttle tanker is in use 
at several fields on the NCS, i.e. from the Alvheim FPSO, Balder FPSO, Jotun A FPSO, 
Navigon Saga FSU, Njord B FSU, Norne FPSO, Petrojarl Varg, Skarv FPSO, Åsgard A FPSO 
and Åsgard C FSU. It is further planned to apply tandem offloading from FPSOs on Goliat and 
Knarr. (Kvitrud et al., 2012, Clarkson, 2013, ABF, 2014). On the UKCS, tandem offloading 
from FPSO/FSU to DP shuttle tanker is in use at Alba FSU, Anasuria, Aoka Mizu, Bleo Holm, 
BW Athena, Captain FPSO, Emerald FSU, Global Produser III, Gryphon A, Haewene Brim, 
Maersk Curlew, North Sea Producer, Petrojarl Banff, Petrojarl Foinaven, Schiehallion FPSO, 
and Triton FPSO (Clarkson, 2013, ABF, 2014). There are also a substantial number of fields 
that uses taut hawser based offloading (Vinnem, 2013a). 
2.3.2 FPSO station-keeping 
The North Sea offers some of the world`s toughest environmental conditions. The combination 
of large waves, strong ocean currents and strong winds, make marine operations in such areas 
are very demanding for both personnel and equipment. The complexity and size of the vessels 
have increased tremendously in the last decades and technical developments are continuously 
pushing the limits for what is technically possible, e.g. improvements to the DP systems are 
offering the possibility of expanding the vessels operational envelope. However, as one is 
positioned on utmost part of the technical frontier, it is necessary to be continuously considering 
the risks involved in order to ensure safe operations.  
The ability of an FPSO to accommodate its positioning and motion control requirements is vital 
for both the functionality and operability of the unit. A FPSO must be capable of handling the 
environmental conditions and control its motions, in order to meet station-keeping 
requirements, e.g. from the riser system.  
Floating offshore units are typically dependant on moorings as their principal means of station 
keeping. This applies to all normal design conditions as well as design storm conditions. Several 
types of mooring systems are applicable to FPSOs, e.g. turret moorings, articulated towers and 
soft yoke systems. Such systems allow the FPSO to weathervane2. Moorings are further often 
assisted by thrusters to keep the FPSO within its operational excursion limits, the thrusters 
providing improved heading control. However, the mooring system is designed to withstand 
the forces independently, in order to account for a sudden loss off thruster power. 
                                               
2 Rotation of FPSO in compliance to the direction of external forces. (Paik and Thayamballi, 2007) 
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Figure 3: Alvheim FPSO with disconnectable STP system (APL, 2010). 
Figure 3 shows the Alvheim FPSO with its disconnectable submerged turret production system 
(STP). The system comprises of the turret buoy, to which the mooring, risers and umbilical 
components are connected, and the FPSO`s shipboard system, consisting of all equipment 
needed for connection and operation of the STP system. The STP system allows the FPSO to 
shut down production and disconnect from the turret, e.g. in case of extreme weather conditions. 
The FPSO can later relatively quickly reconnect to the turret and resume operations (Aanesland 
et al., 2007). 
(Paik and Thayamballi, 2007) describes the actions that are initiated in response to forces of 
nature on board a FPSO to be different from those on a trading tanker, which can be explained 
by their different operational patterns. Waves are commonly considered the primary force 
acting on a trading tanker for design purposes, and a trading tanker can simply adjust its sailing 
pattern to accommodate bad weather situations. Whereas on a stationary FPSO, the high 
requirements for operational uptimes requires the FPSO to be designed for less frequent bad 
weather situations, involving combinations of strong currents, high velocity winds and large 
waves. 
2.3.3 Shuttle tanker station-keeping 
As this thesis only considers shuttle tankers using DP for station-keeping during offloading 
operations, non-DP shuttle tankers are excluded from the discussion. However, one should be 
aware that such shuttle tankers are applied in tandem offloading operations at some oil fields. 
The complexity of tandem offloading operations, especially in terms of strict demands for 
relative station keeping, inflicts high demands for the shuttle tankers positioning capabilities. 
Hence, most shuttle tankers tend to be equipped with an advanced DP system as well as 
tremendous propulsion capabilities. (Helgøy, 2003) describes a state of the art DP shuttle tanker 
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in year 2003. It is equipped with twin propulsion engines, each capable of delivering up to 
15000 [HP], two bow thrusters of 2400 [HP] each, as well as two tunnel thrusters aft of 1400 
HP each.  
The shuttle tankers DP system is completely automated; receiving input typically from two or 
three positioning reference systems (PRS), thrust measurements from each propeller/thruster, 
as well as speed measurements. Thus, the DP operator’s (DPO`s) role is generally passive, 
consisting of monitoring the DP system and making small adjustments if necessary. However, 
due to the possibility of the DP system failing, the DPO must at all times be ready to take 
manual control over the vessel (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011).  
It is a regulatory requirement for all shuttle tankers performing tandem offloading, from fields 
on the NCS having a post 2002 production consent, to be of DP2 class. Although it did not 
become mandatory until 1 January 2002, it has long been industry practice in Norway to require 
DP2 shuttle tankers for FPSO offloading operations from all fields north of the 62nd parallel. 
On the UKCS however, the Oil & Gas UK (OGUK) FPSO Guidelines only requires the use of 
DP2 shuttle tankers in environmentally sensitive areas or the Atlantic frontier. Thus, there is no 
specific requirement for the use of DP2 shuttle tankers in tandem offloading operations on the 
UKCS. (Vinnem, 2013a), estimates that 90% of operations on the NCS, and 20% of operations 
on the UKCS, have been performed with DP2 shuttle tankers. 
2.4 DP SYSTEM 
A dynamic positioning (DP) system is defined as a set of components employed to keep a 
floating vessel`s position stationary, or following a predefined route, by the use of propellers 
(Tannuri et al., 2006). (IMCA, 2007) further defines a fully operational DP system as a system 
that is capable of maintaining the vessel`s motions and control system accuracy within half the 
critical excursion limit for the task performed.  
Generally, a DP system consists of three main areas: power, control and references (IMCA, 
2007). Figure 4 provides an illustration of the various parts of the system and their interactions. 
References denote the instruments providing information concerning position, environmental 
forces and vessel behaviour. Power denotes systems generating, distributing and consuming 
power. Control denotes the position control system and the power management system. (IMCA, 
2007) states that regardless the degree of redundancy provided in the DP system, some control 
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elements will be common. Thus, the most crucial constituents of the DP system are the 
constituents that connect multiple key pieces of equipment together. 
 
Figure 4: DP system`s main parts (IMCA, 2007). 
Floating vessels are affected by complex environmental forces, which initiate minimum two 
separate vessel motions. The vessels are induced with large first-order wave-frequency forces 
and moments by wind generated waves, as well as low-frequency oscillations and steady 
motions due to wind, current and wave drift forces. The DP system must be able to suppress or 
counteract these motions in order to keep the vessel`s mean positions as close as possible to the 
predefined point or route. As it would be very demanding (and energy consuming) for the 
system to have the DP control system handling actual wave frequency motions, sophisticated 
filtering algorithms are applied on the input signals in order to separate the wave induced 
motion from the motion caused by slowly varying disturbances. It is common for commercial 
DP systems to use observer-based techniques, e.g. Kalman filtering which uses available 
information about the induced motions’ dynamical behaviour alongside a predictor, to create 
an optimum state estimator (Tannuri et al., 2006). 
The shuttle tanker`s displacement can increase by a factor of four during loading operations, 
thus changing its dynamic properties. Consequently, a constant gain controller in the DP system 
is undesirable, as it would imply the DPO constantly staying alert and correcting the shuttle 
tanker`s position manually, in order to safeguard against the approximations by the DP system 
(Tannuri et al., 2006). Therefore, the shuttle tanker`s DP system features special DP modes for 
maintaining a constant relative position to the FPSO during tandem offloading: a function 
DP System
References
Position
Environment
Vessel
Power
Generation
Distribution
Consumption
Control
Power management 
system
Position control 
system
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accounting for surge/sway motions of the FPSO, and a function accounting for sway/heading 
motions of the FPSO. Together, these functions ensure that the shuttle tanker maintains its 
relative heading and distance to the FPSO, whilst avoiding excessive position adjustments from 
the shuttle tanker`s DP system (Chen, 2003).  
2.4.1 Surge/Sway function 
The DP system views the FPSO`s stern as a stationary point on the earth`s surface in normal 
‘Approach’ and ‘Weather Vane’ modes. Since the position of the FPSO`s stern is in fact 
continually changing due to fishtail and surge movements, doing tandem offloading operations 
in such DP modes would lead to excessive position corrections from the shuttle tanker DP 
system, and its current estimates would also be incorrect. The Surge/Sway function accounts 
for this by defining a rectangle window that the FPSO stern can move within, without the shuttle 
tanker readjusting its relative position. If the FPSO moves outside current window, the window 
will be readjusted to the new position of the stern, and so on. The rectangle window’s size can 
within a pre-set limit, be determined by the DPO. Further, relative and absolute reference 
systems are applied in combination to enable such position keeping, i.e. Artemis and DARPS 
in combination with DGPS (Chen, 2003). 
2.4.2 Sway/Heading function 
Maintaining a minimum mean relative heading difference between the shuttle tanker and FPSO 
in tandem offloading operations, i.e. maintaining the shuttle tanker pointing towards the FPSO`s 
stern hawser terminal point, is crucial due to the hawser and loading hose stretching between 
the vessels. Thus, swift heading changes of the FPSO impose problems, which is especially 
common for vessels without heading control. To counter this, the DPO of the shuttle tanker can 
pre-set a maximum limit for the heading difference in the DP system. The Sway/Heading 
function will then monitor the heading of the FPSO through data-link information from the 
vessels’ DARPS system and activate the shuttle tanker`s thrusters, when necessary, to correct 
the relative heading (Chen, 2003).  
2.4.3 DP class 
IMO has released a set of guidelines for DP vessels, “Guidelines for vessels with dynamic 
positioning systems” (IMO, 1994). It defines a set of equipment classifications for DP vessels, 
which are listed in Table 2, along with the corresponding DP classifications of Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV) and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).   
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Table 2: DP classifications (KM, n.d., IMCA, 2007). 
IMO DNV ABS Class requirements 
- 
DPS 0 
DYNPOS-
AUTS 
DPS-0 
The vessel possesses manual position control and automatic heading 
control under specified maximum environmental conditions. Any 
single fault may cause position loss. 
Class 1 
DPS 1 
DYNPOS-
AUT 
DPS-1 
The vessel possesses automatic and manual position and heading 
control under specified maximum environmental conditions. Any 
single fault may cause position loss. 
Class 2 
DPS 2 
DYNPOS-
AUTR 
DPS-2 
The vessel possesses automatic and manual position and heading 
control under specified maximum environmental conditions. Two 
independent computer systems are installed so that any single fault 
cannot cause position loss, excluding loss of a compartment. 
Class 3 
DPS 3 
DYNPOS-
AUTRO 
DPS-3 
The vessel possesses automatic and manual position and heading 
control under specified maximum environmental conditions. A 
minimum of two independent computer systems and a back-up system 
separated by A60 class division are installed so that any single fault 
cannot cause position loss, including loss of a compartment due to fire 
or flood.  
2.4.4 Bridge layout 
(Chen, 2003) provides a detailed description of a typical bridge layout, related technical 
systems, as well as the operational process applied, for a DP class 2 shuttle tanker in tandem 
offloading. The bridge has a DP console with two DP computers, one active and one in standby 
for redundancy. The active unit is called ‘Master’ and the backup unit is called ‘Slave’. Above 
the DP console is the position reference system (PRS) screens, which encompasses screens for 
each of the PRS’ installed, i.e. Artemis, DARPS, and BLOM positioning monitoring system 
(PMS). Next to the DP console is the Bow Loading System (BLS) console, from which the oil 
transferring process is controlled. The bow loading operation can be monitored by three video 
cameras installed in the shuttle tanker`s bow. The live feed from the cameras is shown on the 
video screen, along with information about the hawser winch, loading hose connection and the 
separation distance between the shuttle tanker and FPSO. An illustration of a typical DP shuttle 
tanker bridge layout is included in appendix A2. 
2.5 TRAINING OF PERSONNEL 
This section provides an overview of the training scheme for DPOs onboard shuttle tankers. 
More specifically, it presents the offshore loading training course provided by the Ship 
Modelling & Simulation Centre AS (SMSC) in Trondheim, Norway. SMSC is a renowned 
provider of maritime courses and simulation of marine operations. 
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The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) have been influential to FPSO and 
shuttle tanker vessel operators, issuing multiple guidance documents concerning training and 
operation of DP vessels, e.g. “Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically 
Positioned Vessels”(IMCA, 2007) and “The training and Experience of Key DP Personnel” 
which is now a IMO industry standard reference (Daughdrill and Clark, 2002). It has further 
been a requirement for DPOs performing operations on the on the NCS, to undertake formal 
training in the use of DP equipment since 1987.  
The training of DP shuttle tanker operators at SMSC is divided into several phases, to be 
performed in sequence. SMSC offers two different general certification course programs for 
DPOs, one program fulfilling the requirements of the Nautical Institute (NI) Operator training 
scheme and one program fulfilling the requirements of the DNV SeaSkill™ guidelines. Both 
of the aforementioned certification schemes are recognised by the Norwegian Maritime 
Authority (NMA) as being equivalent. 
The candidates have normally been working 1-2 years at sea before first time commencing 
training to become a DPO. These course programs are designed to provide the candidates with 
adequate training to become certified DPOs, according to the candidates’ level of experience. 
The candidates’ has to undertake a general DP introductory course and a simulator course, 
designed to provide the candidates with the knowledge, understanding and abilities necessary 
to operate the DP desk and related equipment. This includes both theoretical education and 
simulator training. 
Experienced DPOs may also undertake specialization and volume training courses, e.g. the 
Offshore Loading course program. The Offshore Loading course program consists of four 
courses, phase 1-4, and focuses on shuttle tanker handling in close proximity to installations. 
The training involves among other simulation exercises reconstructing known DP incidents. 
The specialisation courses can further include field specific simulator training, i.e. simulator 
training where the shuttle tanker, offshore installation, field layout, and sea conditions are 
similar to those where they later will be performing real life operations. Thus, it is possible to 
expose and prepare the candidates for hazardous incident scenarios identical to those that they 
may experience whilst performing real life operations. As the timeliness and correctness of the 
DPO`s actions is critical when facing e.g. a drive-off scenario, such training may prevent 
collisions. 
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According to (SMSC, 2014), the largest changes in the training of DPOs in the last decade has 
been the steps taken to account for the ever increasing technological sophistication of the DP 
systems. Among others this includes the aforementioned customisation in the training of DPOs, 
according to the specific vessel`s they will be operating. The new DNV DPO certification 
scheme differentiates based on the DP functionality of the vessels, e.g. station-keeping, shuttle 
tanker, advanced, rig. Moreover, the new scheme targets the DPOs’ level of experience to a 
larger extent than before, requiring the students to display more of their practical capabilities, 
along with requirements for seagoing experience and formal training. Moreover, in contrast to 
the NI training scheme, it is a requirement of the DNV DPO for the student to pass the final 
examination in order to be certified.  
This chapter has introduced the main issues of performing tandem offloading operations 
between FPSO and shuttle tanker. As the thematic foundation for this thesis has been presented, 
the next chapter introduces relevant risk theory and the methodology applied in this thesis 
analysis. 
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3. THEORY AND METHOD 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a brief overview of relevant theory and 
methodologies on risk. Chapter 3 is divided into two main parts, the first part covering basic 
risk theory and the second part outlining the concepts of risk management and barrier 
management. Appendix A1 further includes a list of definitions for common terms found in risk 
literature. 
3.1 BASIC RISK THEORY  
This section presents some of the fundamental concepts of basic risk theory. These concepts 
form the basis for the scientific approach to managing risk. 
3.1.1 Risk definitions 
The risk literature operates with numerous definitions of the term ‘risk’, and no unified 
definition for the term has been agreed to. (Aven and Renn, 2010) presents several common 
risk definitions: 
- Risk equals the expected loss. 
- Risk equals the expected disutility. 
- Risk is the probability of an adverse outcome. 
- Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects. 
- Risk is the combination of probability and extent of consequences. 
- Risk is equal to the triplet (si, pi, ci), where si is the ith scenario, pi is the probability of 
that scenario, and ci is the consequence of the ith scenario, i=1,2,3,..,N. 
- Risk is equal to the two-dimensional combination of events/consequences and 
associated uncertainties (will the events occur, what will be the consequences). 
- Risk refers to uncertainty of outcome, of actions and events. 
- Risk is a situation or event where something of human value (including humans 
themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain. 
- Risk is an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something 
that humans value. 
The aforementioned definitions of risk may be grouped into two main categories (Aven and 
Renn, 2010): 
1) Risk stated as probabilities and expected values 
2) Risk stated as events/consequences and uncertainties. 
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A new risk definition is further proposed: 
“Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of 
an activity with respect to something that humans value” (Aven and Renn, 2010, p. 8). 
In terms of international standards, it is common to define the risk according to category 1, i.e. 
as a combination of an event`s probabilities and consequences. Moreover, equation (1) works 
as an expression for practically calculating the risk, R.  
 𝑅 = ∑(𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑖)
𝑖
 
(1) 
where: 
𝑝𝑖 = probability of accidents. 
𝐶𝑖 = consequence of accidents. 
The risk is calculated as the product of the probability and numerical value of the consequence, 
for each accident sequence i, summed over all possible accident sequences. It should however 
be noted that the expression is only a statistical measure of the risk, implying that its resulting 
value might never be observed in practice (Vinnem, 2013a). 
Probability 
There are two common interpretations of probability, i.e. the frequentist3 interpretation and the 
subjectivist 4  interpretation. The frequentist interpretation considers the long-term relative 
frequency of an event, and assigns probabilities based on this. E.g. if you flip a coin a sufficient 
number of times and record each outcome, the number of heads and tails will eventually be 
equal. Thus yielding that the long-term probability of each outcome in 0.5. The subjectivist 
interpretation however, is based on degrees of belief for the various outcomes of an event, and 
is often applied in situations where there is a lack of sufficient data for applying the frequentist 
interpretation. In such cases, one can e.g. have a group of experts assigning probabilities for the 
various outcomes of an event based on their subjective judgement. 
Consequence 
In risk literature, the term ‘consequence’ describes the result of an event occurring. 
Consequences have an effect on the objective, which can be both positive and negative. 
Moreover, a single event can produce a series of consequences (ISO, 2009).   
                                               
3 Also referred to as ‘physical’ or ‘objective’ probability interpretation. 
4 Also referred to as ‘evidential’, ‘Bayesian’ or ‘subjective’ probability interpretation. 
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3.1.2 Risk elements 
In literature, risks are commonly subdivided into risk elements and classified according to what 
or whom the risks affect, i.e. personnel, environment or assets. More specifically, when 
considering offshore installations (Vinnem, 2013a) presents the following definitions for the 
risk elements: 
 Personnel risk: Only applies to risk for employees, thus risk to the public is excluded. 
The risk element includes diving accidents, transportation accidents, major accidents, 
occupational accidents  
 Environmental risk: Applies to risk for the external environment inflicted by hazards 
linked to production installations and associated operations. The risk element includes 
oil spills from emerging from blowouts, shuttle tanker accidents, leaks and seepages 
from production equipment, leaks and ruptures of pipeline and risers, as well as 
excessive contamination from releases of fluids from the installation.  
 Asset risk: Generally applies to risk that have non-environmental and non-personnel 
accident consequences, which may also have potential consequences for the 
environment and/or personnel. The risk element includes fires accidents, crane 
accidents, external impacts, extreme environmental loads, ignited and unignited 
hydrocarbon gas or hydrocarbon fluid leaks, as well as ignited leaks of other fluids. 
3.2 RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk is a fundamental element in all of an organisation`s undertakings and hence risk 
management constitutes an essential part of an organisation`s activities (ISO, 2009). Overall, 
risk management refers to the process of generating and assessing options for initiating or 
changing human activities or structures, in order to prevent harm to humans and assets, as well 
as increasing the net benefit to human society (Renn, 2005). Moreover, it can be defined as the 
undertakings performed to direct and control risk in an organisation (ISO/IEC, 2002).  
The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) has provided a generic guideline for 
the risk management, ISO 31000 (ISO, 2009), which includes a framework for the risk 
management process, as illustrated in Figure 5. The main steps of the ISO model, obtained from 
(ISO, 2009) are briefly outlined in the following:   
Communication and consultation: It is important to communicate and consult with 
stakeholders, both internal and external, throughout the risk management process, as their risk 
perceptions influences their judgement of risk. The perceptions of the stakeholders ought to be 
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identified, documented and considered during the decision making process, due to the potential 
for the stakeholders’ views having a strong influence on the decisions made. 
 
Figure 5: The risk management process. Adopted from (ISO, 2009). 
Establishing the context: Establishing the context for the risk management process involves 
defining internal and external parameters to be considered in risk management. Moreover, it 
contributes to manifesting the organisation`s objectives and sets the scope and risk (acceptance) 
criteria for the rest of the process. 
Risk identification: Risk identification involves creating a comprehensive list of risks, through 
the process of identifying events that have the potential for generating, enhancing, preventing, 
degrading, accelerating or delaying objective achievement. This list will further form the basis 
for the selection risks to be included in the risk analysis 
Risk analysis: Risk analysis involves assessing the types, consequences and likelihood of risks. 
The analysis may be qualitative or quantitative, and its level of detail may vary, depending on 
the risk, the analysis’ objective, and availability of information. 
Risk evaluation: Risk evaluation has the objective of deciding on which risks that needs to be 
treated. A risk`s necessity and priority for risk treatment, is judged based on the result from the 
risk analysis. 
Risk treatment: Risk treatment involves the process of considering risk treatments and deciding 
on the acceptability of the remaining risk levels, as well as considering the treatment`s 
effectiveness. 
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Monitoring and review: Monitoring and review can be viewed as the continuous process of re-
evaluating the steps in the risk management process. Among others, this can involve assessing 
installed risk control measures, gaining further information about the risks, and identification 
of emerging risks. 
3.2.1 Risk assessment 
Risk assessment has the objective of identifying and exploring the types, frequencies, and 
probabilities of the consequential events related to a risk (Renn, 2005). Moreover, it should 
“…decide on risk reducing measures in the context of a structured, systematic and documented 
process” (Vinnem, 2013a, p.71). On the UKCS and NCS, it is a requirement of the authorities 
for operators to perform risk assessments, documenting that the level of risk is within what is 
found to acceptable. Upon deciding the tolerability or acceptability of risks, it is the 
responsibility of risk management to mitigate the consequences by deciding on applicable 
actions. Overall, risk assessment consists of two main parts, risk analysis and risk evaluation. 
The objective of risk evaluation is to assess the risk relative to the risk acceptance criteria. 
Further, it shall propose measures for mitigating the risk. (Rausand, 2013) 
Risk analysis 
Risk analysis has the objective of identifying hazards and estimate the risk to individuals, assets 
and the environment, through the methodical use of available information. It consists of three 
main steps, hazard identification, frequency analysis and consequence analysis. This involves 
answering three fundamental questions (Kaplan, 1991): 
- What can go wrong? 
- What is the likelihood of it happening? 
- What are the consequences? 
The first question can be answered by risk scenarios, i.e. scenarios describing the hazards or 
threats assessed. The second question is answered by a assigning a probability to the scenario. 
The last question is answered by a quantitative or qualitative description, or evaluation, of the 
scenario`s consequences (Nordgård et al., 2007).   
In general, there are two main categories of risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis and 
qualitative risk analysis. Qualitative risk analysis involves performing a subjective evaluation 
of the probability and impact of a risk. It can involve prioritizing identified risks using a pre-
defined scale, based on their likelihood and impact. Examples of qualitative risk analysis 
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include Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Safety and Operability Study (SAFOP), 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA).  
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) has the main objective of quantifying a risk`s possible 
outcomes and associated probabilities. A QRA will normally focus only on the highest priority 
risks. Moreover, the result from QRA should give a detailed demonstration the risk picture`s 
elements, by providing relative comparisons of mechanisms and contributions. Relevant 
parameters for presenting the risk may include accident scenarios, failure types, risk-
contributing activities, event sequences for barrier failure scenarios, as well as cause and 
location of accident initiation (Vinnem, 2013a). In order to achieve the aforementioned, the 
methodology applied should be focused on establishing principles, methods and models that 
are satisfactory for  describing and analysing risk (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). 
It is worth noting that some literature applies the abbreviation QRA to describe ‘Quantitative 
Risk Assessment’, the latter term including risk evaluation in addition the risk analysis. 
However, this thesis only applies the first mentioned meaning of the abbreviation. 
Risk acceptance and evaluation 
As stated by (Renn, 2005), risk exposure, incurred actively or passively,  occurs due to risk 
constituting an integral factor in the actual activities that is designed to fulfil a particular human 
need or purpose. Thus, one does not expose oneself to risks for the sake of the risks themselves. 
In the oil & gas industry, it is common for the authorities to issue standards, setting upper limits 
for the level of risk that is found to be acceptable, i.e. risk acceptance criteria (Aven and 
Vinnem, 2005). There are several approaches to determining the acceptable level of risk, and 
the limits often vary between industry sectors, countries, etc. The basis for setting the criteria 
may include governmental requirements, standards, theoretical knowledge, norms, and 
experience. Usually, risk acceptance criteria are defined in a way that the risk is either accepted 
or rejected. It should however be noted that, as stated in (Aven and Vinnem, 2005), there are 
ambiguous views on the use of risk acceptance criteria among risk analysis experts and others. 
On the UKCS, the UK safety case regulations (HSE, 2006) require operators to prepare a ‘safety 
case’ for their offshore installations, demonstrating that relevant statutory provisions have been 
met. Upon approval of the safety case, the installation may initiate operation. The safety case 
requirements include among other demonstrating that all hazards and risks that could 
potentially cause a major accident have been identified and evaluated, and that measures for 
controlling the major accident risks have been, or will be, implemented. This requires for a 
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QRA to be performed using the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle. The 
principle of ALARP implies that the risk should be reduced to a level that is as low as 
reasonably practicable, based on cost-benefit analyses and cost/effectiveness analyses of 
possible risk mitigation measures. As shown in Figure 6, the standard approach for applying 
the ALARP principle implies classifying the risk with respect to three regions, i.e. the risk is 
considered either unacceptable, acceptable or tolerable.  
 
Figure 6: Levels of risk and ALARP. Adapted from (Bell and Reinert, 1992). 
A risk in the unacceptable region usually implies the activity has to be abandoned, a risk in the 
tolerable region must be reduced according to ALARP, and a risk in the acceptable region 
requires no further risk management action. The risk mitigation measures should be 
implemented unless it can be demonstrated that the resulting costs and operational constraints 
are clearly disproportionate to the benefits achieved (Aven and Vinnem, 2005). Although 
ALARP is a British risk acceptability framework, it has been extensively adopted by other 
nations, including Norway. 
On the NCS, the safety regime applicable to the oil & gas industry is based on the principle that 
it is the full responsibility of the licence holder to ensure that the petroleum activities are 
performed in compliance with legislative requirements (NTS, 2010). In 1981 it became a 
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requirement of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) for performing QRA for all new 
offshore installations, as stated in their guidelines for safety evaluation of platform conceptual 
design (NPD, 1980). The regulations provided a cut-off criterion for the accident frequency 
limit, all of which accidents that occur more frequently are to be used to define design basis 
accidents. Further, before commencing operations on a new installation, the licence holder is 
required to provide documentation of the relevant requirements being fulfilled. Since then, the 
guideline have been replaced by new updated regulations, however the cut-off criterion is still 
valid. The additions to the regulations include amongst others NS 5814, which demands for a 
risk acceptance criteria to be defined prior to performing a risk analysis, as well as the 
incorporation of the ALARP principle in the risk management framework. The cut-off criterion 
for offshore installations has been set to a frequency of 1.0E-04 accidents per platform year, 
and is applicable to the FPSO – shuttle tanker collision risk (Vinnem, 2013a).  
3.2.2 Human and organisational factors 
This section presents the theoretical basis for the approach to human and organisational factors 
(HOFs) applied in this thesis. HOFs and technical factors can have a significant impact on safety 
barriers, and some barriers are completely dependent on human intervention in order to perform 
their intended function. Furthermore, HOFs are fundamental in preparing, analysing and 
interpreting results from the QRA, as safety barriers are defined and explained by the HOFs 
influence (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011).  
The recognition of the causal relationship between human error and casualties at sea has been 
around for centuries. However, the concept of marine safety standards and human factors in 
marine operations did not receive much attention until in the late 1800s, when there was a 
tremendous increase in marine passenger traffic. World War II further increased the scientific 
research on human factors in the maritime domain, the focus being mainly on work task 
efficiency rather than accidents. Yet, the positive results from this research acted as a 
springboard for continued research into the human element of marine operations (Grech et al., 
2008). The scientific area of HOFs is however vast and its theoretical platform has not been 
settled (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). This thesis focuses on HOFs in relation to collision 
accidents, and the theory presented has been selected accordingly. 
Human factors 
Human factors is defined by (Goodwin, 2007) as the scientific discipline encompassing theories 
and knowledge about human behavioural and biological characteristics, that are validly 
applicable for specification, design, evaluation, operation and maintenance of products and 
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systems, in order to promote safe, effective and satisfying use by individuals, groups and 
organisations. Human factors may thus be regarded as covering a range issues, i.e. human 
perception, physical and mental capabilities, individuals’ interactions with their job and work 
surroundings, human performance under influence by equipment and system design, as well as 
the influence of organisational characteristics on safety related work behaviour (Skogdalen and 
Vinnem, 2011).  
Human error 
Interchangeable use of the terms ‘human error’ and ‘human factors’ occurs frequently in 
literature, and clear definitions rarely given. However as noted by (Goodwin, 2007, Skogdalen 
and Vinnem, 2011), its essential to differentiate the two, the first mentioned being the 
underlying causes of accidents, and the second mentioned being the immediate causes. (Grech 
et al., 2008) defines human error as an inappropriate or undesirable human decision or 
behaviour, resulting in, or having the potential for adverse results.  
Human error is a contributing element in numerous maritime accidents and incidents. Research 
indicates that for every severe accident, there are a greater number of near-misses, and an even 
greater number of safety-critical events (Grech et al., 2008). Thus, accident statistics only show 
the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Figure 7 shows the classic iceberg model for accidents. The ratio 
between the different categories may vary according to the type of industry; however, it 
provides an intuitive illustration of the pyramidal relationship between the categories. 
The logic behind the iceberg model is that the frequency of events in the respective categories 
increases as one moves from top to bottom. The bottom category contains the numerous and 
virtually invisible, but potentially dangerous, unsafe acts and ordinary work routines that have 
the potential of developing into an event in one of the other categories. Consequently, only 
investigating accidents, incidents and near misses implies omitting a large quantity of 
information (Grech et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 7: The classic iceberg model for accidents. Adapted from (Grech et al., 2008). 
Accidents
Incidents
Near misses
Unsafe acts
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Perspectives on the human element in safety engineering 
In general, there are two basic perspectives on human errors and human factors: the system 
approach and the person approach. The person approach focuses on unsafe acts resulting from 
deviant mental processes of individuals, e.g. inattention and irresponsibility. Consequently, this 
approach applies countermeasures directly targeting adverse human behaviour. The system 
approach on the other hand, views unsafe acts as the result of systemic factors, e.g. 
organisational processes, rather than individual factors. Further, the systematic approach views 
the human condition as unchangeable, and thus defences against human error should be 
incorporated in the system (Reason, 2000). 
Organisational factors 
(Øien, 2001) states that the field of research on risks emerging from organizational factors, 
emerged from the realization that human error and technical failure were not the definitive 
answer as to what was the root cause of every major accident. Amongst the first to take action 
upon the new insight, was the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which launched several 
research projects on safety performance indicators in the beginning of the 1980’s. This resulted 
in the nuclear organisation and management analysis concept (NOMAC).  
Today, IMO has recognised that although human errors are commonly found to be primary 
causal contributors to accidents, investigators should not explicitly focus on the personnel 
directly involved in the accidents (sharp-end personnel), but rather take into consideration the 
conditions surrounding the sharp-end personnel and the organisation that permitted the 
hazardous conditions to exist (Chen et al., 2013). People in a work environment are influenced 
by three areas, namely the organisation, the job, and personal factors. These areas are further 
directly influenced by the organisation`s communication systems, training systems and 
operational procedures (Stranks, 2005). These “surrounding” conditions are known as 
‘organisational factors’. 
Organisational factors are characterised by an organisation`s design of job positions and work 
task division, as well as the selection, training, cultural indoctrination and coordination of the 
workforce, in order to perform their activities. In relation to safety, the key aspects for an 
organisation in the oil & gas industry includes factors relating to complexity, size and age of 
installation, and factors determining the organisational safety performance, e.g. 
communications, coordination, leadership, manning (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). 
In relation to organisational factors, the system approach accounts for both internal (e.g. 
personal characteristics) and external conditions (e.g. work organisation) influencing human 
3. Theory and Method 
27 
behaviour, by recognizing that although individuals may influence the operational risk5, the 
organisational factors plays a key role in determining the organisations exposure to the risk 
imposed by individuals.  
3.2.3 Risk Influencing Factors 
RIFs are identified through the process of grouping comparatively steady conditions 
influencing the risk into sets, a single RIF representing the average level of one set of 
conditions. Moreover, the RIFs may be improved through specific actions. (Vinnem et al., 
2003b) presents the following category divisions and corresponding definitions of RIFs, which 
are also utilized in this study: 
 Operational RIFs: 
o Activities essential to ensure safe and efficient tandem loading operations on a 
daily basis. Specifically, it comprises requirements and conditions in relation to 
shuttle tanker technical dependability, state of operational dependability of the 
composite loading system as well as other external interfaces and conditions.  
 Organisational RIFs: 
o Organisational RIFs are related to the management’s philosophies and strategic 
choices in relation to the technical and operational foundation, along with 
control, support and management of daily activities in shuttle tanker operations.  
 Regulatory RIFs: 
o Regulatory RIFs are related to requirements and regulatory activities from 
authorities. 
RIFs can be an important tool for identifying which factors that interact and influence risk. The 
interactions of such factors can be further investigated, using the sociotechnical system model. 
The sociotechnical system model provides a systematic methodology for assessing human, 
organisational, and technological factors, as well as how their interactions influence system 
performance. The model, as presented in Figure 8, consists of seven main areas (Grech et al., 
2008):   
 Individual: Factors relating to humans as an individual, e.g. individual physical or 
sensory limitations, human physiology, psychological limitations, individual workload 
management and experience, skill, knowledge. 
                                               
5 Risk of loss, which originate from the fact that people, processes and systems of an organisation are imperfect. 
(Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
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 Group: Factors relating to interpersonal interaction, e.g. teamwork, communication, and 
leadership.  
 Practice: Factors relating to interaction between the individual and practice, i.e. how 
the humans obtain system knowledge through practice. 
 Technology: Factors relating to the interaction between the individual and technology, 
e.g. equipment, usability, human machine interaction (HMI). 
 Physical environment: Factors relating to the surrounding working environment, e.g. 
physical workspace environment, weather/visibility conditions, lightning conditions. 
 Organisational environment: Factors relating to company and management, e.g. 
procedures, policies, norms, rules.  
 Society and culture: Factors relating to the socio-political and economic environment 
surrounding the organisation.    
 
Figure 8: The sociotechnical system model by Thomas Koester (Grech et al., 2008). 
3.2.4 Barriers and barrier management 
This section provides a presentation of relevant theory on barriers and barrier management. As 
the barrier concept is treated differently in literature, depending on the context, the focus in this 
thesis is directed towards applications in the oil & gas industry. Moreover, barrier analysis- and 
management methodologies developed specifically for assessing risk relating to offshore 
installations, are presented.  
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Barriers are important measures for risk mitigation in any system. As previously stated, hazards 
can be interpreted as sources of physical harm, which can transform into an accident by means 
of a hazardous event occurring. The barrier concept is about separating something valuable 
from a hazard by installing a barrier between the two. (NTS, 2010, Skogdalen and Vinnem, 
2011, Vinnem, 2013a) presents a set of definitions for the terms barrier functions, barrier 
systems and barrier elements. Their respective definitions being as follows:  
 Barrier function: Functions intended to prevent, control or mitigate undesired or 
accidental events. The term ‘intended’, i.e. planned, suggests that at least one of the 
functions’  purposes is risk reduction (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). 
 Barrier system: System designed and implemented to perform one or more barrier 
functions.  
 Barrier element: A component of the barrier system, which isolated is not capable of 
performing the required barrier system function. 
 Barrier influencing factor: factor that influences barrier performance. 
Safety barriers 
Safety barriers are defences implemented in a system to protect people, assets and the 
environment from hazards, i.e. safety barriers are implemented in order to minimise the 
probability of hazardous events and/or limit the consequences of such events. Safety barriers 
can be either proactive or reactive, depending on if their intended function is to provide 
protection pre or post the event (Xue et al., 2013).  The defence can be everything from a single 
technical unit to a complex socio-technical system. It is further common for safety barriers to 
be required and specified in legislation and standards within different industries (Skogdalen and 
Vinnem, 2011). In relation to safety engineering, it is moreover common to view the barrier as 
a means of protecting humans from an energy source, as shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: Energy model for barriers (Sklet, 2006b). 
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Figure 10 further illustrates relationship between the various definitions relating to safety 
barriers. The safety barrier function is realised by the safety barrier system. Moreover, the safety 
barrier function describes the intention of the barrier, i.e. how the barrier is to perform in order 
to accomplish the task it has been given. This means that if the barrier function is accomplished, 
it should have a direct and substantial effect on the frequency and/or the consequences of an 
undesired event or accident (Sklet, 2006a). 
The safety barrier system can further be classified as passive or active, the main difference 
being that passive barriers are built into the system design and are able perform their function 
independent of input external control systems, e.g. an operator or a control system, whilst active 
barriers are dependent on such input (Sklet, 2006b). Further classification may also include 
classifying the barriers as physical, technical or human/operational systems. Physical barriers, 
e.g. firewalls, are usually performing their function nonstop and do not require activation. 
Technical barriers, e.g. emergency shutdown system, are activated upon the realisation of a 
hazard. Human/operational barriers, e.g. safety distances and third party control of work, can 
either be continuously activated or activated upon demand (Sklet, 2006b). The barrier 
performance may further be characterised by their attributes, i.e. reliability/availability, 
response time, functionality/effectiveness, robustness, and triggering event or condition 
(Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). 
 
Figure 10: Safety barrier classification (Sklet, 2006b). 
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Barrier analysis  
As presented in Section 3.2.1, it is a requirement on both the NCS & the UKCS for performing 
risk assessment of new offshore installations. As safety barriers are key for reducing risk, safety 
barrier analysis is an important formal requirement of QRA. Furthermore, in order to assess the 
influence of human and organisational factors, it is essential to define and model safety barriers. 
In cases where HOFs dominate a particular hazard mechanism, there should be performed a 
comprehensive analysis of operational barriers (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011).  There are many 
different methods for performing barrier analysis, e.g. ‘Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis’ 
(BORA), the Operational Condition Safety (OTS) method, the Bow-tie method. No matter 
which method applied, the barrier analysis should identify the barrier systems and their 
functions, performance requirements, barrier influencing factors, as well as assess how barrier 
performance can be increased. 
This thesis applies only applies the bow-tie method explicitly in its barrier analysis. However, 
the Swiss cheese model, shown in Figure 11, is included in this section as it provides an 
illustrative method for communicating how accidents may occur in complex systems. It is a 
conceptual framework, conveying the fact that accidents are not caused by isolated failures, but 
are rather the result of several failures, on different system levels, occurring simultaneously. A 
breach in a system`s defences is illustrated by the red arrow, imitating the accident trajectory. 
Normally, the defence layers will be interacting and supporting each other. But in some 
instances, the “holes” may align, creating an accident trajectory (Grech et al., 2008). The Swiss 
cheese model for a particular accident can be built by examining the barriers in the system and 
their failure modes. The “holes” in the barriers are present because of either latent conditions 
or active failures, the former often being connected to organisational factors (Xue et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 11: The Swiss cheese model (Reason, 2000). 
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Bow-tie analysis  
A bow-tie diagram, as shown in Figure 12, provides a graphical presentation of an accident 
scenario, illustrating the connections between causes and consequences for the TOP event.  
 
Figure 12: Bow-tie diagram. 
It is in essence a combination of a fault tree on the left-hand side and an event tree on the right 
hand-side. Hence it can aid in the process of understanding of which combinations of primary 
events that can cause the top event to occur, and the consequence resulting from a particular 
safety barrier`s failure (Khakzad et al., 2012). This insight can further be applied to introduce 
new barriers in the system and for evaluation of barrier performance. 
The bow tie analysis in this thesis was performed using BowTieXP from CGE Risk 
Management Solutions. The main steps in performing such an analysis are as follows (CGE, 
n.d.): 
- Identify the hazard(s) present in the system (Hazard) 
- Identify what happens if the hazard is released (TOP event) 
- Identify what can cause the hazard to be released, and how control can be lost? (Threats) 
- Identify the potential outcomes (Consequences) 
- Identify measures for preventing or limiting the effect upon a release of the hazard 
(Barriers). 
- Identify the barrier failure modes  (Escalation factors)
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4. ANALYSIS OF FPSO – SHUTTLE TANKER COLLISION RISK 
Chapter 3 have presented the general theoretic and methodological basis for this thesis approach 
to risk. In this chapter, the information provided in chapter 2 and chapter 3 is further applied to 
investigate the collision risk in FPSO-shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations. Moreover, 
this chapter provides this thesis’ risk analysis and it is divided into three main parts:  
 Part 1 establishes the overall risk picture in relation to collisions between DP shuttle 
tanker and FPSO when performing tandem offloading operations in the North Sea. 
 Part 2 provides a review of previous research performed on the specific topic of this 
thesis. 
 Part 3 presents this thesis’ risk analysis, in which qualitative and quantitative methods 
are applied to investigate the collision risk. HOFs and technical factors are assessed, 
before a barrier analysis is performed. Moreover, the collision frequency model applied 
to investigate incident data for the UKCS & NCS from 1995-2013, is outlined. 
4.1 THE RISK PICTURE 
(Chen and Moan, 2002) found the incident frequency for FPSO-shuttle tanker tandem 
offloading operations in the North Sea to be relatively high, estimating the collision frequency 
to be in the order of one collision per four hundred offloading operation. As the shuttle tanker 
and FPSO both have large masses, and consequently large momentums, it implies that the 
collision damage potential is also large. If the shuttle tanker collides with the FPSO, it may 
cause extensive deformation of the FPSO stern. This involves a significant risk of oil spill into 
the ocean or water ingress into the damaged vessels. Moreover, it may also cause damage to 
the flare towers that have to be located in the stern area due to the crew`s living quarters being 
located in the bow section. Thus, a collision has the potential of causing a chain reaction of 
dangerous events.  
4.1.1 Accident scenarios 
(Chen, 2003, Vinnem et al., 2003b, Skogdalen et al., 2009), presents four accident scenarios 
relating to FPSO-shuttle tanker collisions during tandem offloading, shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Collision scenarios for tandem offloading operations. 
Initiating event 
Drive-off Drift-off Surging Yawing 
Shuttle tanker is driven away 
from its targeted/wanted 
position by its own thrusters 
in offloading operation. 
Environmental forces 
push shuttle tanker in 
the direction of 
FPSO. 
Asynchronous relative 
surge motions 
between shuttle tanker 
and FPSO. 
Significant mean heading 
differences and 
asynchronous relative yaw 
motions between shuttle 
tanker and FPSO. 
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Principally, a drive-off can be in any direction. However, due to the shuttle tanker being 
positioned astern of the FPSO during tandem offloading, only a drive-off in forward can result 
in a collision (Skogdalen et al., 2009). Furthermore, since a shuttle tanker waiting at the field 
will be positioned on the FPSO’s leeward side, in order to prevent drifting accidents, a drift-off 
scenario’s influence on the collision frequency is normally fairly low (Vinnem, 2013a). 
Therefore, this thesis only investigates the drive-off scenario, which is also considered the most 
critical by the aforementioned studies.  
4.1.2 Collision experiences from FPSO – shuttle tanker offloading 
(Leonhardsen et al., 2001) reports three collisions involving FPSOs on the NCS in the period 
1997-2001, one of which happened during offloading between FPSO and shuttle tanker. There 
were no reported collisions involving FSUs during the same period. The shuttle tanker Knock 
Sallie collided with ‘Norne FPSO’ in 2000, upon completion of a cargo offloading operation, 
due to the thrusters suddenly giving maximum thrust when switching the DP system from 
weathervane to auto position. The collision energy has later been estimated to be 31[MJ]  (Chen 
and Moan, 2005). The accident investigation found the accident to be the result of a 
malfunctioning DP system as well as a corresponding mal operation and slow reaction from the 
DPO.  
In 2006, the shuttle tanker ‘Navion Hispania’ collided with Njord Bravo FSU during 
connection. The initiating event was a blackout on the shuttle tanker, causing it to lose most of 
its thrust capacity and subsequently hit the aft of the FPSO. The collision energy is estimated 
to have been about 61 [MJ]. The accident investigation revealed that following the loss of thrust 
capacity, the DP system was nonetheless maintained in auto positioning mode. Several system 
failures, mal operation of the DP system, inadequate training of personnel and not following 
procedures, were amongst the main causes for the accident (Kvitrud et al., 2012). 
For the UKCS, the author has not found detailed reports of the collision incidents, which are 
available to the public. However, the following collision incidents and vessels involved, have 
been identified from (Chen and Moan, 2002, Bradbury, 2009): 
 The shuttle tanker Clipper collided with Emerald FSU on 28.02.96.  
 The shuttle tanker Futura collided with Gryphon FPSO on 26.07.97.  
 The shuttle tanker Aberdeen collided with Captain FPSO on 12.08.97.  
 The shuttle tanker Nordic Savonita collided with Schiehallion FPSO on 25.09.98. 
 The shuttle tanker collided Lord Rannoch collided with Schiehallion FPSO on 08.10.09 
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4.1.3 Reporting of collision incidents 
On the NCS, regulations for petroleum activity demands that incidents related to permanently 
installed installations are reported to the NPD. The NPD has been collecting data on incidents 
and reports on condition deviations for installations on the NCS since the mid-1970s. The 
collected data, to be used for statistical and analytical purposes, is put into the CODAM 
database and graded according to their level of severity, i.e. insignificant, minor, major 
(Leonhardsen et al., 2001). 
The HSE Offshore Safety Division (HSE OSD) have been maintaining a database of 
vessel/platform collision incidents on the on the UKCS since 1985. However, it was found that 
the database contained numerous inconsistencies and unconfirmed data. This  information gap 
was addressed by the HSE OSD in  (Robson and Britain, 2003), which presents an updated 
database of UKCS collision incidents, compiled from several collision incident sources. Yet 
they found it probable that the database was still suffering from a degree of under-reporting, 
mainly from incidents with little or no damage to the units involved. Several projects on 
accident statistics have been performed since then, e.g. (DNV, 2007, Funnemark, 2001). 
Today, the reporting requirements of incidents involving floating units operating on the UKCS 
are dependent on the operation mode and geographical location at the time when the incident 
occurred. It can be either the HSE OSD, the HSE Field operations Division (HSE FOD), or the 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) (DNV, 2007). 
The likelihood of under-reporting to the incident databases, as mentioned in (Robson and 
Britain, 2003), is probably also relevant for the incident databases on the NCS. However, in the 
last decade, as procedures for incident reporting, have improved along with a greater degree of 
transparency in offshore safety reporting, the likelihood of underreporting may have decreased. 
Amongst the issues that have been discussed is the definition of ‘near-miss’ incidents, i.e. what 
incident are to be classified as such. 
4.2 PREVIOUS PROJECTS ON THE SUBJECT AND LESSONS LEARNED 
This section provides a general overview of the major research papers published on the subject 
of FPSO – Shuttle tanker collision risk. It is divided in two subsections, according to if the 
research was published pre or post year 2003. This is in compliance to the research objectives 
of this master thesis’, i.e. to investigate and compare the current situation to the situation at the 
time when the JIP report was released. Further, two reports, which the author finds to be the 
most influential on this field of research, is presented more in detail. 
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4.2.1 Pre 2003 
(IMCA, 1999) presents the results from a frequency study on collisions incidents involving DP 
shuttle tankers performing offloading, covering all station-keeping incidents reported to IMCA 
from 1979 up until August 1998. The study includes all offshore export facilities and is not 
limited to the North Sea. The study reports 134 such incidents spread over 9946 offloadings, 
and 16 of those incidents are identified as forward drive-offs, of which 12 resulted in collision. 
The drive-off forward frequency is estimated to 1.6E-03 per offloading and the collision 
frequency is estimated to 1.2E-03 per offloading. It should however be noted that these 
frequencies are average frequencies, encompassing all offshore export facilities. Furthermore, 
the frequencies are estimated from data collected during almost two decades, a period in which 
there was a tremendous development in the technological equipment applied in offloading 
operations. 
(Leonhardsen et al., 2001) summarizes the NPD`s operational experience of FPSOs on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) pre 2001. At the time when the report was published, five 
FPSOs and three FSUs were in operation on the NCS. The FPSOs were all turret moored, 
weathervaning vessels, positioned at water depths ranging from 85-380 m. The study revealed 
that all but one of the reported ‘high energy collisions’6 on the NCS from 1982-2000 was related 
to the DP system either malfunctioning or being mal operated. It was also reported one drive-
off during positioning for FPSO offloading. Furthermore, the study assessed the overall 
collision frequency for FPSOs/FSUs on the NCS to be 0.154 per year, which is more than 2.5 
times   the overall collision frequency of gravity-based structures (GBS). However, the report 
notes that their data shows that the collision frequency for FPSO cargo offloading operations is 
significantly lower, 0.051 per year. In comparison, loading buoy cargo offloading operations 
has a collision frequency of 0.078 per year. 
(Chen and Moan, 2002) presents a collision modelling approach for FPSO – shuttle tanker 
offloading operations. The model integrates human actions, technical events and their 
interaction when causing an unintended powered forward movement of the shuttle tanker. The 
study further investigates the failure prone situations, identified by the model, in order to 
investigate the chain of events and possible recovery actions in a shuttle tanker initiated 
recovery scenario. Applying the perspective of human action timing, the success of the recovery 
                                               
6 Collision involving either vessels above 5000[tonnes], high-velocity impacts from vessels below 5000 [tonnes], 
or unauthorized vessels (Leonhardsen et al., 2001). 
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is analysed, and recommendations are made for measures that can mitigate the failure of 
recovery in design and operation. 
4.2.2 Post 2003 
(HSE, 2005) provides a review of incidents involving DP shuttle tankers performing offloading 
from FPSO/FSU on the UKCS, covering the period from 1998 to August 2004. It reports 19 
incidents involving loss of position and collision with loading point (or very high hawser 
tension), in the course of 66829 DP hours. Based on this, the frequency is estimated to be 2.76E-
04 per DP hour.  
(OGUK, 2009) provides the most comprehensive published collection of accident and incident 
statistics for offshore units on the UKCS, covering the period 1990-2007. Statistical data were 
collected from four different incident databases, namely COIN/Orion (UK HSE OSD), 
Offshore Blowout Database (SINTEF), WOAD (DNV), MAIB (UK Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch). Overlapping records in the databases were removed and average annual 
incident frequencies are presented per type of installation. For monohull units, i.e. FPSOs and 
FSUs, there have been 17 occurrences of collisions/accidental contacts between installation and 
visiting vessel, e.g. tugs, supply vessel, shuttle tanker, etc., from 1990-2007. Moreover, the 
incidents were distributed with eight incidents and nine incidents, occurring in the periods 1990-
1999 and 2000-2007 respectively. The average incident frequency for 2000-2007 is estimated 
to 0.071 per unit year. The estimate is based on a total of 127.1 unit years.  
(Chen et al., 2010) presents a probabilistic modelling of the risk of a collision involving a 
geostationary FPSO and a shuttle tanker in direct offloading. Opposed to turret-moored FPSOs, 
geostationary FPSOs do not weathervane and direct offloading from the latter presents a relative 
recent addition to North Sea shuttle tanker operations. A case study is performed, the result 
from which demonstrate that the collision risk level is significantly reduced in the direct 
offloading compared to the tandem offloading.    
(Kvitrud et al., 2012) investigates 13 position incidents involving shuttle tankers performing 
offloading operations on the NCS, that occurred in the period 2000-2011. It provides the most 
updated review of such incidents on the NCS, per mid. 2014. The first section of the article is 
devoted to presenting an overview of the current regulations and guidelines applicable to 
FPSOs/FSUs and shuttle tankers on the NCS. The second section offers a statistical overview 
of the collisions that occurred. The third section provides a short review the 13 position 
incidents, i.e. the collisions, near collisions and other incidents (i.e. loss of position control 
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incidents, in which position control was recovered). A discussion of the necessities for 
improvement is provided in the last section of the article.  
Further, (Kvitrud et al., 2012) found that up until year 2000, there were many incidents and 
collisions during FPSO/FSU shuttle tanker offloading operations. In the years 2001-2005, a 
period in which several major research projects concerning such operations were performed, 
there was only one position incident reported to the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA). However, as shown in Figure 13, since 2006 there has been at least one incident each 
year up until 2011. Based on this, (Kvitrud et al., 2012) states that the improvements made in 
the early 2000`s appear to have disappeared.  
 
Figure 13: Collisions and position incidents involving offshore shuttle tankers, reported to the PSA in the period 2000-2011 
(Kvitrud et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the study found the average age of the shuttle tanker at the time of collision to be 
3.5 years, whilst for the shuttle tankers involved in near collision and position related incidents, 
the average age was 9.7 years and 10.7 years respectively. Based on this, it is suggested that the 
reason for new shuttle tankers seemingly being more likely to be involved in collision incidents, 
is due to the new on-board equipment not being adequately tested as well as the new teams 
operating the vessels.  
4.2.3 ‘FPSO Operational Safety’JIP project 
From 1996-2003, the R&D project ‘FPSO Operational Safety’ was performed as a Joint 
Industry Project (JIP). It was funded by HSE, Statoil, and Exxon. In addition, Navion 
contributed as technology sponsor. The overall objective of the JIP project was to integrate 
human reliability science into predictive models and tools for analysis of safety of FPSOs. In 
order to achieve this, there was a need for developing such models and tools. Further, it was 
intended to test out the methodology on selected case studies and illustrate the possible results 
from project implementation.  
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It was found that previous risk assessments performed on FPSO operations, failed to adequately 
consider Human and operational factors, which resultantly lead to such factors being ignored 
during the design. Further, numerous additional failure scenarios were identified. 
The project had several objectives in relation to the FPSO – Shuttle tanker collision risk:  
 To demonstrate the importance of HOF for the collision risk. 
 Identification and evaluation of factors that from a HOF point of view determines the 
collision risk. 
 To propose potential risk reduction measures relating to HOF for the collision risk and 
indicate importance. 
A risk assessment of tandem offloading operations between FPSO and shuttle tankers on the 
NCS & UKCS was performed, covering position incidents from 1995-2003. The study`s main 
focus was on drive-off incidents, but also other potential position incident scenarios such as 
fishtail/heading deviation, and surging. Further, a detailed risk assessment was made for six 
incidents, considering various field configuration parameters, i.e. FPSO with/without heading 
control, shuttle tanker DP class, offloading interface system, and FPSO-shuttle tanker 
separation distance. The main contributors to the collision frequency, considering a drive-off 
scenario, were considered based on expert assessments and experience from previous incidents 
involving FPSO and shuttle tanker. Incidents where there was adequate information available 
were also assessed in terms of the time usage in the different stages of recovery actions. Results 
showed that for the incidents that had resulted in a collision, the minimum time and maximum 
time for initiating recovery action, was 40 seconds and 120 seconds respectively. Moreover, for 
the incidents that did not result in a collision, time for initiating recovery action was found to 
be close to 40 seconds.  
Observations from the incidents investigated in detail, indicated that the main contributors to 
drive-off incidents are ‘shuttle tanker positioning and control system’, ‘shuttle tanker crew 
competence’, ‘FPSO positioning and control system’, and ‘shuttle tanker work organisation’. 
The shuttle tankers’ positioning and control system was found to be a contributor in all six 
incidents. Identified causes were DP system receiving erratic input from PRS, and the DPO 
having problems figuring out the DP system`s response upon certain inputs, due to the systems 
complexity. The average contribution was considered as more than 30%.  
Shuttle tanker crew competence was found to be a contributor in five of the incidents. It was 
identified that inadequate competence amongst the crew had caused mal operation of the DP 
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system, as well as that the DPO`s reaction time when experiencing system failures/unintended 
movements, was too slow, contributing to the incidents. The average contribution was 
considered more than 30%. Further, FPSO positioning and control system, and shuttle tanker 
work organisation was found to have had a significant influence in two incidents and three 
incidents respectively. An overall ranking of the operational RIFs was made, as presented in 
Table 4. It shows that the competence of the crew as well, as the positioning and control system 
on board the vessels involved in the offloading operation, is considered as essential contributors 
to the collision risk. 
Table 4: Overall ranking of operational RIFs (Top 10) (Vinnem, 2013b). 
No. RIF description Ranking 
1.14 ST crew competence 1 
1.6 ST positioning and control system 2 
1.2 FPSO positioning and control system 3 
1.11 FPSO crew competence 4 
1.9 ST-FPSO technical interface 5 
1.10 Operational procedures 6 
1.17 ST-FPSO operational interface 7 
1.16 ST organisation of work 8 
1.20 Environmental conditions 9 
1.7 ST maintenance, repair and modifications 10 
Table 5 further presents a ranking of the operational RIF groups (definitions provided in Section 
3.2.3), based on the aforementioned assessments. It shows that the combination of “Technical 
and Human/Operational” factors is assessed to have the greatest contribution to the collision 
frequency, followed by “Human/Operational dependability” and “Technical and 
Human/Operational and External”. 
Table 5: Ranking of operational "RIF groups" (Vinnem, 2013b). 
Ranking Ranking of RIF group/ RIF group combination Contribution 
1. Technical and Human/Operational  40% 
2. Human/Operational dependability 15% 
3. Technical and Human/Operational and External 15% 
4. Technical dependability 10% 
5. Human/Operational and External 10% 
6. Technical and External 8% 
7. External conditions 2% 
The study further presents several risk mitigation measures for FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading 
operations, which covers HOFs, shuttle tanker positioning system, shuttle tanker man-machine 
interface, as well as FPSO specific features and FPSO shuttle tanker interface. 
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4.2.4 ‘Probabilistic evaluation of FPSO-tanker collision in tandem offloading 
operation’ 
This report presents the PhD thesis of Dr. Ing. Haibo Chen, undertaken at the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology. The overall objectives of this study was to analyse the 
collision risk between FPSO and shuttle tanker in tandem offloading operation, considering 
both operational and technical aspects, by creating a quantitative frequency model. Further, the 
developed model was to be applied on case studies from the North Sea, in order to identify 
measures for mitigating the collision risk during such operations. The author was conscious that 
a lack of focus on human and organisational aspects in quantitative offshore risk analyses, had 
led to a risk mitigation approach that was concentrating on hardware failures. Generally, this 
approach had proved to be an inefficient approach for reducing risk in intricate marine 
operations.  
The collision frequency model developed in this study divides the position incidents into two 
phases, an initiating phase and a recovery phase. The initiating phase comprises the shuttle 
tanker experiencing an uncontrolled forward movement; more specifically the study focuses on 
shuttle tanker drive-off forward scenarios. By the use of statistical data from previous studies 
and incident databases, along with expert judgements of shuttle tanker DPOs, the drive-off 
frequency is described on a macroscopic level. Results from the analysis indicate a drive-off 
frequency of in the range of 5.4E-03 to 2.0E-02 per offloading and a collision frequency of 
3.0E-03 per offloading. The drive-off frequency is further investigated on a microscopic level 
by performing a closer study of nine events involving drive-off during tandem offloading. This 
involved studying investigation reports, as well as having interviews and discussions with 
people involved in these events. 
Results from the study further shows that the drive-off frequency can effectively be reduced by 
focusing on minimising the situations where failures are prone to occur, i.e. situations where 
the relative motions of the shuttle tanker and FPSO are large. Such situations are further 
explored by the study in a time-domain simulation code, SIMO, which`s result show that e.g. 
coordination of the mean heading between the FPSO and shuttle tanker, and dedicated DP 
software for tandem offloading,  can effectively minimize the relative motions.  
 The recovery phase comprises the recovery actions of the FPSO and shuttle tanker to avoid the 
collision, the focus in this study being on shuttle tanker DPO initiated actions. The available 
response time for the DPO, i.e. the time available for initiating recovery action in order to 
prevent contact between the vessels, is assessed to be marginal. The information processing 
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phases of the DPO, in relation to initiating action when faced with a drive-off scenario, is 
modelled using an information-decision-execution model. The model result is further used 
along with expert judgment and results from a survey among DP officers and shuttle tanker 
captains, to find realistic estimates of the time window necessary for the operator to initiate 
recovery action.  
The results from the assessment of the recovery phase indicated that the time window available 
for recovery action initiation was insufficient, suggesting that incidents of failed recovery action 
may be the consequence of insufficient time for the operator to initiate action. Based on this, it 
is recommended that the time window available for recovery action initiation should be 
increased. The effect from substantially increasing the distance separating the FPSO and shuttle 
tanker during offloading, is further investigated. Numerical estimates for necessary separation 
distances are obtained based on parametric drive-off simulations in which the operator reaction 
time is varied. It is suggested that the results can be used in selecting optimal field configuration 
for FPSO – shuttle tanker tandem offloading. 
The study further recommends that the DPO should be assisted in initiating recovery action, 
since the reaction time can be reduced by means of early detection and/or reduced decision-
making time. Various measures to reducing the time for detecting and diagnosing signs of 
abnormal vessel behaviour, as well as means for increasing situational awareness, are identified 
and discussed. The human factor perspective of the collision in FPSO-shuttle tanker tandem 
offloading operations is particularly elucidated by the findings of the investigation, e.g. 
procedures, training of personnel and MMI.  
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4.3 RISK ANALYSIS 
In order to enable comparison of the risk levels presented in this thesis against the results of 
(Chen, 2003) and (Vinnem et al., 2003b), the analysis of the collision risk is performed using 
the same framework as the aforementioned studies. This involves investigating the risk by 
applying both quantitative and qualitative methods.  
This thesis’ qualitative risk analysis encompasses an assessment of HOFs and technical factors, 
as well as a barrier analysis. The quantitative risk analysis encompasses an investigation of 
incidents and collisions, using a collision frequency model and simple statistical analysis. 
Moreover, the quantitative analysis covers all reported incidents on the UKCS and NCS in the 
time period from 1995-2013, and was performed using Microsoft Excel. The specific 
framework and models applied is outlined in the following sections. 
4.3.1 Describing the shuttle tanker collision hazard 
The theory presented in this section is forms the basis for the subsequent section, which deals 
with HOFs and technical factors in tandem offloading operations 
(Vinnem et al., 2003b, Chen and Moan, 2002)  found the prevalent understanding of the FPSO-
shuttle tanker collision hazard, viewing it as being almost completely determined by the shuttle 
tanker`s operational and technical capabilities, to be an oversimplification, that neglects the 
human factor. Applying the classifications of (Vinnem et al., 2003b, Vinnem, 2013a, Chen, 
2003), the tandem offloading collision failure model, for a scenario where the collision is 
initiated by a shuttle tanker drive-off,  is divided in two phases with the following characterising 
parameters: 
 The initiation phase, where the shuttle tanker has an uncontrolled powered forward 
movement (UPFM), i.e. drive-off. Characterising parameter: Resistance to drive-off. 
 The recovery phase, where the recovery action proves insufficient for avoiding a 
collision, i.e. failure of recovery (FOR). Characterising parameter: Robustness of 
recovery. 
The characterising parameters can then be applied in order to assess the influence of various 
field configurations for FPSO – shuttle tanker offloading, on both HOF and technical related 
aspects of the collision risk. Table 6 provides an overview of the parameters and related factors 
in the collision failure model in tandem offloading operations. As seen from the table, the failure 
frequency of both the shuttle tanker and FPSO is dependent on the DPO/station-keeping 
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operator, as well as the possibility of the main engines, control systems or reference systems 
suffering a breakdown.  
(Vinnem et al., 2003b) found that the shuttle tanker is especially vulnerable to drive-off when 
there is excessive relative motion, i.e. yaw and surge motions, between the shuttle tanker and 
FPSO. In such situations, the shuttle tanker may have e.g. insufficient thruster capacity, causing 
a heading deviation, upon which DPO may choose to take manual control. Thus, there is a 
subsequent increased risk of technical failure or erroneous action. Further, (Chen and Moan, 
2005) found that surging and yawing of the FPSO has a significant contribution to the 
occurrence of situations where there is excessive relative surge and yaw motions.  
Table 6: Definition of parameters and related factors in collision failure model for tandem offloading (Vinnem, 2013a). 
Phase Characterising parameter Related factors 
‘Initiation 
phase’ 
‘Resistance to drive-off’: 
Factors concerning the control of vessel 
movements, on both FPSO and shuttle tanker. 
For shuttle tanker:  
 Station-keeping system, i.e. DP, 
PRS(s), vessel sensors, main CPP(s), 
thruster(s), and related propulsion 
systems. 
 DPO. 
For FPSO: 
 Station-keeping system, i.e. DP (if 
present), main CPP(s), vessel 
sensors, thruster(s), and related 
propulsion systems. 
 Station-keeping operator. 
‘Recovery 
phase’ 
‘Robustness of recovery’:  
Factors concerning the shuttle tankers ability 
to initiate successful recovery in drive-off 
situations, i.e. initiate collision-avoiding 
actions upon a drive-off. 
Available time (time window): 
 FPSO – shuttle tanker separation 
distance 
 DP class and capacity of main 
propulsion system of the shuttle 
tanker. 
 Operational phase 
Necessary time for initiating action: 
 Alarm design and setting 
 Level of attention and job attitude. 
 Training and operational experience 
of operator (operator competence). 
In relation to parameter ‘Robustness of recovery’, it is worth noting that the recovery actions 
are initiated and performed by the shuttle tanker DPO. Due to the aforementioned and the 
limited time available for action initiation in order to be able to avoid a collision, the human 
action-time perspective is relevant for addressing the robustness of recovery. Such a perspective 
provides a tool for determining what factors influence the time available for action initiation 
(time window) and what factors influence the time needed for the DPO to initiate action 
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(reaction time). It is assumed that the robustness of recovery is greater the longer the time 
window and/or the shorter the reaction time (Vinnem, 2013a). 
Based on HOFs and technical factors, it is possible to assess the DPO`s information processing 
when facing drive-off scenarios. (Chen, 2003) presented an Information-Decision-Execution 
model for such purposes, as shown in Figure 14. The first stage of the model addresses how the 
DPO becomes aware of the drive-off. This involves detecting and observing abnormal signals, 
e.g. the DPO may observe a sudden increase in thruster output on the DP control panel 
(detection), upon which he may start actively searching for information to what is causing it 
(observation). The second stage of the model addresses how the DPO processes the information 
(state evaluation) and decides on what task(s) he considers the appropriate response to the 
situation (task formulation). This involves assessing the criticality of the situation and the 
available response time. The third stage of the model addresses how the DPO performs and 
confirms the execution of the task(s) he has decided on, i.e. how the formulated tasks are 
converted into a series of muscle commands, upon which the DPO verify that the execution is 
accomplished. 
 
Figure 14: Information-Decision-Execution model for DPO reaction in drive-off scenarios (Chen, 2003). 
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4.3.2 Human, organisational, and technical factors in offloading operations 
In the following section, selected human, organisational, and technical factors are assessed in 
relation to their relevance in tandem offloading operations. As previously stated, this thesis 
applies the system approach, more specifically it applies the sociotechnical system model as 
presented in (Grech et al., 2008), which was outlined in Section 3.2.2. The assessment is further 
based on the findings of (Vinnem et al., 2003b), as presented in Section 4.2.3. The study found 
that in relation to the collision risk in offloading operations, the immediate causes could be 
associated with technical dependability RIFs, human/Operational dependability RIFs and 
external conditions RIFs. Moreover, their observations indicated that the main contributors to 
drive-off incidents are ‘shuttle tanker positioning and control system’, ‘shuttle tanker crew 
competence’, ‘FPSO positioning and control system’, and ‘shuttle tanker work organisation’.  
Individual factors 
Performing operations in a maritime environment implicates the use of multiple human 
abilities, e.g. human senses, perception, situation awareness, decision-making, physical 
strength and motor skills. Moreover, the aforementioned abilities are influenced by personal 
factors (e.g. age, gender.), maritime experience level, transient forms of impairment (e.g. 
fatigue, drugs.), and permanent forms of impairment (e.g. medically related disorders) (Grech 
et al., 2008). Thus, the concept of performance-shaping factors, i.e. features influencing the 
operators’ performance when carrying out tasks, is vital for understanding how human factors 
influence offloading operations. In the following, performance-shaping factors found relevant 
for the DPO are reviewed, i.e. factors relating to work-rest cycles, mental workload and 
psychological stress.  
In relation to work-rest cycles, general fatigue is highly important. General fatigue can be 
viewed as the effect of the accumulated stresses inflicted on the operator on an everyday basis, 
which includes the intensity and duration of mental work, time of the day the work is performed, 
as well as the operator’s prior amount of sleep. Such factors must be balanced by restitution 
(Grech et al., 2008).  During offloading operations, the operator is likely to be negatively 
influenced by all of the aforementioned stresses, implying the possibility of fatigue reducing 
their work performance. The nature of offloading operations demands for a DPO to monitor the 
shuttle tankers position for the entire duration of the operation, a task that normally requires 
high levels of concentration. Additionally, offloading operations are often performed at night, 
a time of the day, which is associated with reduced human alertness. Although the shuttle tanker 
is in auto DP mode, the DPO must stay alert and be prepared to respond swiftly upon position 
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abnormalities. Consequently, long continuous hours on watch-keeping duty and night-time 
operations can reduce the DPO`s operational performance, which may further have an impact 
on the operational risk. As it has been found difficult to measure operator fatigue’s contribution 
to accidents directly, quantifications are commonly based on operator performance measures 
and subjective ratings. 
Mental workload describes the degree of mental effort required by an operator when performing 
his duties and it increases along with the work tasks’ complexity. Moreover, the mental 
workload in marine operations is dependent on a number of factors, which includes the number 
of tasks to be performed, time allocation for completing tasks, level of task difficulty, required 
degree of accuracy/proficiency, individual factors, and factors related to the working 
environment. By reviewing the aforementioned factors, it is clear that an operator facing a high 
workload has the option to compensate by increasing the effort or by reducing task performance  
(Grech et al., 2008). As mentioned in Section 2.4.4, during offloading operations, the DPO must 
continuously monitor several parameters, presented on multiple displays. Due to the long 
duration of offloading operations and the use of auto DP mode, the DPO will experience long 
periods of inactivity. This can lead to the DPO becoming distracted from his work tasks, which 
poses a risk, especially when considering a drive-off scenario. In addition, shuttle tanker DPOs 
have described that it is not uncommon for various low-level alarms to go off frequently on the 
bridge, and the DP system`s user interface is often designed so that it is not possible to separate 
a high-level alarm from a low-level alarm (SMSC, 2014). Hence, the alarms can be a major 
source of distraction to the DPOs. 
Psychological stress onboard marine vessels can be described as when crew members perceive 
it as being impossible, or nearly impossible, to accommodate tasks and demands (internal 
and/or environmental). This can may cause the crew to neglect aspects of their tasks, as 
psychological stress is prone to inflict a narrower focus on the affected individual (Grech et al., 
2008). As DP systems are becoming increasingly more advanced, the demands for the DPOs’ 
system understanding also increases. This may inflict stress, especially on less experienced 
DPOs. Moreover, considering a drive-off scenario, there may be multiple alarms sounding (e.g. 
position warnings and warnings related to the imminent cause of position loss). The DPO will 
be fully aware of the time pressure for initiating emergency action. However, as it is first 
necessary to identify what is the correct emergency response, the DPO is likely to be under 
immense psychological stress. This may impede his situational awareness and obstruct the 
process of initiating emergency action. 
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Communication and collaboration 
The close proximity of the vessels involved in tandem offloading operations demands for 
effective collaboration and comprehension between the personnel involved. Thus, it is 
important that the personnel have insight and sufficient information about relevant operational 
aspects concerning both vessels, not just their own. As stated by (Grech et al., 2008), good 
communication and team collaboration is essential to the vessels’ safety, as failure of such may 
lead to accidents.  
In any phase of dual vessel operations, operational procedures should be discussed and agreed 
to by appropriate representatives from both vessels (IMCA, 2007). This is important as shared 
knowledge and mutual context of the participants involved in human communication, is 
fundamental to the meaning and understanding of what is communicated (Grech et al., 2008). 
On board the DP shuttle tanker, the master is the person responsible for the safety and 
operations. This includes both the vessel and the crew. He is further responsible for coordinating 
his vessel`s operations with other vessels participating in dual vessel operations. On board the 
FPSO/FSU, the commanding officer is the offshore installation manager. He enjoys the same 
responsibilities as the master on board the shuttle tanker. Furthermore, both the master and 
offshore installation manager has the power to abort operations if they think that the safety of 
personnel, vessel, equipment or environment is compromised (IMCA, 2007). 
Training of personnel 
Investigations of previous accidents have shown that operator action is essential for the outcome 
of a position incident. Thus, human operator risk control is tremendously important (Vinnem, 
2013b). There is a relatively short time window available for the operator to detect, make a 
decision, and initiate recovery. Consequently, training of DP personnel is important factor for 
offloading operations.  
It is critical that the DPO has an in-depth understanding of the vessel`s behaviour, i.e. how the 
vessels inertia influences the vessel`s stopping distance and how the vessel gains momentum 
upon a sudden increase in thruster pitch or power (IMCA, 2007). This is further supported by 
(SMSC, 2014), describing the biggest risk factors in tandem offloading operations to be 
inexperienced personnel facing a drive-off scenario, and their understanding of the shuttle 
tanker`s motions. (IMCA, 2007) further states that the necessary level of training and 
experience of DPOs on a specific vessel may vary, but ensuring sufficient training of DPOs is 
nonetheless key to performing safe and reliable operations. It is further stated that complete 
records of key DP personnel`s training and experience should be kept for competence 
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assurance. This is further supported by (Daughdrill and Clark, 2002), stating that because 
incorrect human intervention potentially can initiate a drive-off scenario, it is critical to ensure 
adequate training and operation of officers involved in vessel position-keeping related 
activities.  
Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) 
Human interaction with technology plays a fundamental part of modern maritime operations, 
e.g. computers, navigational equipment, advanced DP systems and communication have all 
become standard features of modern DP shuttle tankers. As the vessels become more technically 
advanced, it is vital to ensure that the technology is adapted to the operators’ skills, capabilities, 
and limitations. Moreover, the technology must be integrated with the work system onboard the 
vessels (Grech et al., 2008). The interaction between technology and individuals are referred to 
as Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) or Man-Machine Interaction (MMI2). 
(Grech et al., 2008) presents a several issues relating to HMI. For DP shuttle tanker tandem 
offloading operations, the author has found the following HMI issues relevant: equipment 
usability, ergonomic equipment design, training and support of operators, operators’ reliance 
and dependency on technology, integration of new technology, and consideration of human 
factors aspects when developing new technologies. 
Equipment usability describes the degree to which the operator can apply a product swiftly and 
easily (Grech et al., 2008). Absence of usability in technology may understandably be a hinder 
to efficiency and become a source off errors. For DP operated vessels, it is very important for 
the user interface to be designed so that the DPO can effortlessly monitor parameters relevant 
to position keeping and make adjustments if necessary. 
Automation is widely applied in many ship technologies, e.g. AIS, electronic navigation charts, 
DP systems. The use of such technologies increases technologic dependency, which may be a 
source of system vulnerability, e.g. if the technology is causes confusion to the operator or 
malfunctions. (Bainbridge, 1983) states that process automation may increase problems relating 
to human operators, instead of removing them. Moreover, it is stated that as system designers 
frequently seek to remove the human intervention to the largest extent possible, they still end 
up leaving the operator to perform the tasks that they are unable to remove. Several ironies of 
automation, relevant to DP offloading operations, are also presented; automation may cause 
degradation the operators manual control skills and obscure the operators’ overview of the 
process control. The first mentioned could be especially critical in a drive-off scenario, as the 
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DPO`s may not respond as efficient. The second mentioned may also have an impact on the 
DPO`s response as he may be unaware of the exact system state, due to him only passively 
monitoring the DP system. Furthermore, automation may cause alteration of the task it was 
designed to support, introduce new types of human error, and reduce the operators possibilities 
for detecting errors and initiate recovery (Grech et al., 2008).  
Design and integration of technology 
Section 2.4.4 provided a description of the bridge onboard a shuttle tanker, featuring a variety 
of controls and displays. Optimal design of controls and displays is key to ensure safe and 
reliable ship operations. The level of effort and the amount of time that is necessary for a 
crewmember to respond to an event depends on multiple factors, i.e. the degree of prior 
experience with the systems, the complexity of the decision, the degree of correlation between 
the required response action and the event causing the need for action, how expected the event 
was to the crewmember, and the degree of feedback given. Moreover, the crewmembers 
response time is dependent on the controls’ and displays’ compatibility, i.e. the displays’ 
location relative to their associated displays, and the specific control actions needed in response 
to the displays (Grech et al., 2008). E.g. if the DPO is required to take manual control during 
offloading operations, he must also be able to observe relevant data about the shuttle tanker`s 
machinery, DP status, PRS status, etc., simultaneously as he is using joysticks to control the 
vessel. Facilitating the aforementioned has implications for the bridge layout. In addition, the 
DP-controller’s response should ideally match the DPO`s expectations for the response. (Grech 
et al., 2008) states that due to the increasing prevalence of one-man bridge operation, and 
navigational systems and piloting components becoming increasingly integrated, optimisation 
of the displays and controls is possibly more crucial than ever.  
In terms of DP operations, visual warnings and audible warnings (i.e. alarms) are exceptionally 
important. As there are numerous shipboard systems operating simultaneously, warnings are 
essential to alert the DPO of abnormalities in the systems. Moreover, warnings must fulfil two 
critical objectives, i.e. attract attention and provide understandable information so that the 
operator can initiate the right corrective action, and their efficiency is influenced by their 
positioning, size and intensity (Grech et al., 2008). 
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4.3.3 Barrier analysis for drive-off scenario 
The bow-tie method is found to be suitable for investigating the drive-off scenario. This thesis 
applies  the same main analytical principles as (Vinnem et al., 2003b), using  RIFs to investigate 
the collision frequency in FPSO – Shuttle tanker operations, in relation to barriers. Further, the 
basis for this thesis’ selection of elements to include in the barrier analysis, is the assessment 
of HOFs and technical factors presented in Section 4.3.2, as well as a influence diagram for the 
shuttle tanker-FPSO collision risk during tandem offloading operations7 presented in (Vinnem 
et al., 2003b). The barrier analysis is further inspired by the work of (Henningsgård, 2013).  
As described in Section 4.3.1, the collision risk failure model for a drive-off scenario can be 
divided into two phases, the initiation phase and the recovery phase. In line with the rest of the 
thesis, only the drive-off forward scenario is considered. Further, using the bow-tie perspective 
to examine the drive-off scenario, the event also can be divided into two stages accordingly: 
 Left hand side:  
o Initiation phase: How can a drive-off be prevented? 
 Right hand side: 
o Recovery phase: What recovery actions can be initiated to avoid collision? 
The bow-tie analysis will focus on preventing an uncontrolled powered forward motion of the 
shuttle tanker (drive-off forward) leading to a collision. Hence, it should be noted that the 
barrier analysis is limited to the recovery phase, i.e. barriers for avoiding a collision after a 
drive-off has been initiated. As this is a coarse risk assessment, technical considerations of the 
identified barriers are not provided. Furthermore, it does not consider safety barriers relating to 
the process of offloading hydrocarbons, e.g. loading hose, emergency shutdown valves, etc.  
As presented in Figure 15, the TOP event in this barrier analysis is ‘DP shuttle tanker drive-off 
forward, whilst offloading in the North Sea’, and three barrier systems are included in the 
analysis, i.e. alarms, automatic recovery, and manual recovery.  
                                               
7 Included in appendix A5. 
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Figure 15: Bow-tie for recovery phase in drive-off scenario, overview. 
Alarms 
In this context of the drive-off scenario, alarms are technical barriers designed to respond to 
position loss. As shown in Figure 16, two main barrier-influencing factors have been identified: 
 No alarm. 
 DPO does not respond to alarm. 
 
Figure 16: Bow tie for recovery phase in drive-off scenario, alarms. 
Section 4.3.2 provided a discussion of alarms and their influence in a drive-off scenario, and 
the subject is thus only discussed briefly in the following. If the alarm does not sound, the DPO 
may use longer time identifying a position loss, which implies a longer reaction time. This may 
lead to there being insufficient time for the DPO to initiate recovery action. Hence, there ought 
4. Analysis of FPSO – shuttle tanker collision risk 
53 
to be redundancy for the alarms, in order to reduce the likelihood of no alarms sounding. 
Further, if a DPO has problems understanding the criticality of an alarm, he may not respond 
efficiently to the situation, which can also increase the reaction time. Thus, the alarms’ saliency 
should match their criticality. 
Automatic recovery 
The short window of time available for initiating recovery action in a drive-off scenario is a 
major issue for a human operator. Therefore, an automatic recovery system ought to be in place, 
initiating recovery action almost immediately upon an alarm for position loss. As shown in 
Figure 17, one main barrier-influencing factor has been identified: 
 DP system failure 
 
Figure 17: Bow-tie for recovery phase in drive-off scenario, automatic recovery. 
The DP system will perform corrections to the shuttle tanker`s position and thus it ought to 
have DP class 2 or higher, in order to increase its reliability. Moreover, the DPO will monitor 
the recovery process and be ready to perform manual recovery upon a DP system failure.  
Manual recovery 
The final barrier system in this barrier model is manual recovery, which involves the DPO 
taking full control over the shuttle tanker`s manoeuvring. As shown Figure 18, three main 
barrier-influencing factors have been identified: 
- DPO situational awareness 
- DPO performance 
- ST heading towards FPSO 
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Figure 18: Bow-tie for recovery phase in drive-off scenario, manual recovery. 
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The first two factors have already been discussed in Section 4.3.2, and hence they are only 
discussed briefly in the following. 
DPO situational awareness 
The design of the man-machine interface and work-rest cycles has been identified as the main 
barrier elements. When the DPO is required to take manual control, he must also be able to 
observe relevant data about the shuttle tanker`s machinery, DP status, PRS status, etc., 
simultaneously as he is using joysticks to control the vessel. Facilitating the aforementioned 
has an important role in the design of the man-machine interface, which can further have an 
effect on the DPO`s situational awareness.  
The design of DPOs’ work-rest cycles is important as it can have a large impact on their general 
fatigue. Poorly designed work-rest cycles may cause the DPO becoming negatively influenced 
by stress, implying the possibility of fatigue. Moreover, long continuous hours on watch-
keeping duty and night-time operations can reduce the DPO`s alertness, which may further 
cause the DPO to become distracted and reduce his situational awareness.  
Shuttle tanker heading towards FPSO 
As the shuttle tanker is positioned with its bow heading towards the FPSO`s stern during tandem 
offloading, it also implies the two vessels being on collision course when a drive-off is initiated. 
In relation to this, two barrier elements were identified, DPO evasive manoeuvre and having a 
heading deviation between the FPSO and shuttle tanker. 
DPO performance 
The main barrier elements identified for DPO performance are procedures and training, which 
was discussed in Section 4.3.2. The DPO`s reaction time and the degree of cooperation between 
FPSO and shuttle tanker in the recovery, are of vital importance for avoiding collision. The 
DPO`s reaction time could be addressed by ensuring that the DPO competence level increased 
through certification standards and simulator training. Moreover, by increasing the relative 
separation distance, the available time for recovery will also increase. Lastly, the cooperation 
between FPSO and shuttle tanker in the recovery phase could be improved by establishing joint 
emergency procedures for FPSO and shuttle tanker.  
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4.3.4 Collision frequency model 
In order to estimate the collision frequency for shuttle tankers performing tandem offloading 
from FPSO, one must first determine the approach for investigating the collision risk. This 
means deciding on whether to model and analyse the risk using a probabilistic model (e.g. as 
(Chen and Moan, 2004)), using statistical methods (e.g. as in (PSA, 2014a)), or using a 
combination of the two aforementioned. Regardless of the chosen methodology, it is essential 
that the approach covers the nature of such operations and provides an unbiased presentation of 
the results. This could involve considering the frequency of offloading operations, length of 
stay during field visits, separation distance between shuttle tanker and FPSO during operations, 
etc. This thesis applies the collision frequency model of (Chen and Moan, 2004) , as presented 
in equation (2). 
 𝑃𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) 
(2) 
where: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) = probability that the shuttle tanker has an uncontrolled powered forward 
movement, a drive-off. 
𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀)  = probability that the recovery action proves insufficient for avoiding a 
collision, i.e. a failure of recovery. 
It is a probabilistic model for collisions between DP shuttle tankers and FPSOs during tandem 
offloading. However, it is important to highlight that in practise, there is not possible to perform 
a real numerical validation of the drive-off probability and the collision probability. Instead, 
one uses frequencies to note the respective probabilities (Vinnem, 2013a). Moreover, 
𝑃𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) can also be estimated by dividing the total number of collisions by the total 
number of offloadings, yielding the same result as equation (2). 
Model rationale 
The following part of this section provides an explanation and rationale for how the model is 
applied in this thesis’ risk analysis. The rationale for estimating the probabilities is explained 
based on a general collision probability model presented in (Vinnem, 2013a).  
The system investigated in this analysis encompasses the shuttle tanker and the FPSO during 
all phases of tandem offloading operations, i.e. approach, connection, offloading, 
disconnection, departure.  
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Traffic volume 
The traffic volume can be estimated based on the frequency of tandem offloading operations at 
the respective oil fields. A reasonable estimate for the offloading frequency on a particular field 
can be derived by obtaining statistics of the field’s yearly oil production and then divide that 
number by the storage capacity of the FPSO. The result will provide a conservative estimate 
for the number of offloadings, as it assumes that the FPSO`s storage capacity is fully utilized, 
which may not always be the case.   
Probability of the vessels being on collision course 
A collision between two vessels will not occur unless the vessels are on a collision course, thus 
in that sense the occurrence of such a situation is a fundamental constraint for collisions. In a 
general collision model, it is customary to assume that that a vessel will not change its heading 
towards the platform as long as the installation is observable from the vessel, thus one assumes 
that the process up until the point of observation determines the probability of a vessel being 
on collision course, 𝑃𝐶𝐶  (Vinnem, 2013a). However, in the case of tandem offloading between 
shuttle tanker and FPSO, this assumption is not applicable. When a shuttle tanker is performing 
tandem offloading operations, it is in fact required to change its course so that its bow is heading 
in the direction of the FPSO`s stern. During the approach, this means having a controlled 
powered forward movement towards the stern of the FPSO until reaching the predetermined 
separation distance. Further, during the rest of the offloading, up until the point when the shuttle 
tanker has finished offloading and has changed its course for departure, one must assume that 
a drive-off situation may be expected at any point. Thus, the probability of the shuttle tanker 
being on collision course with the FPSO is equal to the drive-off frequency, 𝑃(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀), which 
can be estimated from incident statistics. 𝑃(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) is thus assumed to be dependent on the 
time spent offloading, i.e. the frequency of offloadings. The resulting expression for the 
probability of collision course is then as shown by equation (3): 
 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
 
(3) 
(Vinnem, 2013) states that one aspect of the approach, that might be of concern, is that one 
assumes the navigator to be performing the approach operation responsibly. Although most 
navigators will in fact perform the approach in a responsible manner, there might be one 
individual that does not. That individual is singlehandedly likely to account for 90 % of the 
collision risk. This is a dilemma when trying to select a representable value for the collision 
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risk. However, as it is impossible to model the behaviour of the irresponsible person, such input 
is not included in the model. 
Probability of failure of shuttle tanker initiated recovery 
Following the logic of our adapted model, 𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑅  describes the probability of a collision given 
that the shuttle tanker has experienced drive-off, Pr (𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀), which can be estimated 
from incident statistics. Thus, we obtain the following expression, equation (4):  
 𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑅 = Pr(𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 
(4) 
Moreover, it implies that Pr (𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀)  is assumed to be exclusively dependent on the 
recovery actions of the shuttle tanker. 
Probability of failure of offshore installation initiated recovery 
It is assumed that the offshore installation, i.e. the FPSO, cannot initiate recovery actions to 
avoid collision, i.e. 𝑃𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑅 = 0. Thus, the only vessel to be included in the model is the shuttle 
tanker. This assumption is justified by the fact that the FPSO is moored, and that the time 
available for recovery is in all likelihood too short for the FPSO to be able to disconnect its 
mooring and change its position. It should be noted that there is the possibility of the FPSO`s 
crew to become aware of a potential collision first, and then alert the shuttle tanker`s crew. 
However, it is found difficult to model such intervention accurately, and it is thus not explicitly 
considered in the model. 
Incident frequencies 
In order to estimate the incident frequencies, i.e. the drive-off frequency and the collision 
frequency of DP shuttle tankers during tandem offloading, it was necessary to do extensive 
research and review of available reports and databases for offshore accidents on the NCS and 
UKCS. The work of the UK HSE and the Norwegian PSA has provided key in obtaining 
incident data. This work has further been supplemented by the research of several experts 
investigating shuttle tanker collision risk, e.g. Professor Jan Erik Vinnem (Preventor, NTNU), 
Dr. Haibo Chen (Scandpower) and Arne Kvitrud (PSA). However, the extent of the available 
and applicable data for incidents on the UKCS post 2007 and on the NCS post 2011 is limited. 
As pointed out by (Chen, 2003), DP Shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations from 
FPSO/FSU was not performed on a large scale before the mid-1990s, thus making it difficult 
to obtain detailed statistics for tandem offloading operations performed prior to this. In addition, 
as mentioned in Section 4.1.3, drive-off incidents not resulting in collisions may not have been 
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reported. Further, the technical and operational systems applied in the past may differ from 
current systems that are more sophisticated.  
When assessing frequencies, the choice of how to denote the frequency is very important. The 
general definition of frequency is ‘the number of occurrences of a recurring event per unit time’. 
In the field of statistics, the definition is slightly modified, expressing frequency as the number 
of occurrences of an event in a study. Thus, the definition is adapted to account for the finite 
length and size of the time interval and population size of the study. For the purposes of this 
thesis, relevant frequency denotations include ‘per installation year’ and ‘per offloading 
operation’. However, as stated by (Vinnem, 2013a), the frequency of offloading operations 
greatly varies between different installations, ranging from a dozen times a year to several times 
per week, thus making per ‘installation year’ a fuzzy expression of the collision risk. It would 
imply defining an ‘average installation’, which would not be representable for any actual 
existing installation. Moreover, it complicates comparison between different installations. 
Hence, it is found that ‘per offloading’ is the best way to denote the frequency, accounting for 
the individual oilfield`s characteristics whilst simultaneously enabling intercomparison.  
Deriving the number of offloading operations 
In order to find an estimation for the number of offloading operations performed each year, it 
was first necessary find the production figures from the relevant oil fields on the UKCS and 
NCS. This was obtained through the publicly available databases of the UK Department of 
Energy & Climate Change (DECC) (DECC, 2014) and the NPD (NPD, 2014) respectively. The 
number of offloading operations for a particular FPSO was then obtained by dividing the 
production figures from its associated oil fields, by the FPSO`s storage capacity. Complete 
production and offloading statistics for FPSOs/FSUs on the UKCS & NCS, covering the time 
period from 1995 to 2013, is included in Appendix A6. 
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Figure 19: Shuttle tanker offloadings from FPSOs/FSUs on the UKCS. 
Figure 19 shows the number of shuttle tanker offloadings from FPSOs/FSUs on the UKCS in 
the period 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2013. The total number of offloading operations is 
estimated to 5001 operations. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, there are a substantial number of 
fields on the UKCS that uses taut hawser based offloading. These fields have been excluded 
from the volume of offloading operations presented above.  
 
Figure 20: Shuttle tanker offloadings from FPSOs/FSUs on the NCS. 
Figure 20 shows the number of shuttle tanker offloadings from FPSOs/FSUs on the NCS in the 
period 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2013. The total number of offloading operations is 
estimated to 3701 operations. There is one field on the NCS that uses taut hawser based 
offloading, the Glitne field, and it has been excluded from the volume of offloading operations 
presented above. 
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4.3.5 Statistical analysis of trends 
When assessing trends relating to incident frequencies, it is important to ensure that the 
statistical analysis is unbiased, i.e. ensuring that no statistic is calculated in a way that produces 
inferences that consistently underestimate or overestimate the population’s characteristics 
(Walpole et al., 2007). Further, it is key to eliminate any sources of “false signals”, thus 
ensuring that the trends demonstrated are representative for the development on the UKCS & 
NCS. Statistical normalization is important in this relation, enabling frequency comparison 
based on a normalised parameter, e.g. frequency of incidents per offloading (PSA, 2014b). 
The trend analysis of the incidents is in this thesis is performed using 90% prediction intervals, 
which enables identification of possible trends based on comparison between the observed 
value and the prediction interval. Comparison of observed values and the prediction interval is 
to be interpreted as follows: 
 If the observed value lies in the lower region of the prediction interval, the observed 
value is significantly lower than the average for the period witch the prediction interval 
represents. 
 If the observed value lies in the upper region of the prediction interval, the observed 
value is significantly higher than the average for the period witch the prediction interval 
represents. 
 If the observed value lies in the middle region of the prediction interval, the observed 
value represents no statistically significant change, i.e. there is no statistically 
observable trend. 
The method for calculating the prediction intervals, which was obtained from (PSA, 2014b), is 
outlined in the following: 
Assume a set of measurements for the occurrences in an event category, is recorded in year 
1,2,…,k. Further, let x1, x2, x3, …, xk denote the number of occurrences each year.  
A prediction, X*k+1, for the number of incidents in the present year, Xk+1, is then estimated 
based on the observed values, x1, x2, x3,…, xk. Moreover, a 90% prediction interval [a,b] is 
calculated, representing an interval in which it is believed that there is a 90% probability that 
Xk+1 will fall within.  
The Poisson distribution is then applied in order to express uncertainty, i.e. the number of 
incidents in the present year is predicted using the average of the previous years, and the 
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uncertainty is given by the Poisson distribution. The rationale behind this method is based on 
one assuming that the occurrence of events is a “stable process”, where the number of events 
in each interval is relatively constant. Hence, it is reasonable to predict next year`s number of 
incidents based on the average of the preceding years, and define the uncertainty by the Poisson 
distribution. 
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5. RESULTS FROM QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
This section provides a statistical presentation and assessment of the overall risk picture in 
tandem offloading operations between DP shuttle tankers and FPSOs. In order to perform a 
thorough assessment of possible trends and developments for the incident frequencies, it was 
found appropriate to first provide an overall assessment, and then examine the incident 
frequencies before and after the JIP-project report, (Vinnem et al., 2003b), was released. 
Appendix A7-A11, presents calculations and plots from which the results were obtained. 
Moreover, this chapter solely presents observations from the statistical analysis. Discussion and 
interpretation of the data is omitted, as such is addressed in the first section of chapter 6. 
Table 7  and Table 8 shows the estimated 90% prediction intervals for selected periods. The 
numbers inside the parentheses in the tables’ period column shows the years from which the 
average, used to predict the intervals, was created. As seen from the tables, the intervals for the 
UKCS, the NCS, and the UKCS & NCS aggregated, are equal within the periods 1995-2013 
and 2004-2013. Moreover, all of the estimated prediction intervals start at zero. The respective 
90% prediction intervals are shown graphically in the right corner of the graphs in Figure 22, 
Figure 23, Figure 40, and Figure 41. 
Table 7: 90% prediction intervals for incident frequency per offloading. 
Period UKCS & NCS UKCS NCS 
1995-2013  (03-12) 0.0E+00 - 4.2E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.2E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.2E-03 
1995-2003  (95-02) 0.0E+00 - 7.0E-03 0.0E+00 - 5.6E-03 0.0E+00 - 5.6E-03 
2004-2013  (04-12) 0.0E+00 - 4.9E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.9E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.9E-03 
 
Table 8: 90% prediction intervals for collision frequency per offloading. 
Period 
Average 
interval UKCS & NCS UKCS NCS 
1995-2013  (2003-2012) 0.0E+00 - 4.2E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.2E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.2E-03 
1995-2003  (1995-2002) 0.0E+00 - 7.1E-03 0.0E+00 - 5.6E-03 0.0E+00 - 5.6E-03 
2004-2013 (2004-2013) 0.0E+00 - 4.9E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.9E-03 0.0E+00 - 4.9E-03 
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5.1 INCIDENT FREQUENCY 
This section presents the results from a statistical analysis of all reported incidents on the UKCS 
and NCS in the period 1995-2013. The first part of the analysis comprises the entire period, 
before the two periods 1995-2003 and 2004-2013 are analysed separately.  
Table 9 shows all reported incidents involving DP shuttle tankers performing tandem offloading 
from FPSO on the UKCS & NCS, in the period 1995-2013. The data is sorted by the year the 
incident occurred, along with information concerning geographic location, phase of operation 
in which the incident occurred, type of incident, and the shuttle tanker`s DP class. For one 
incident that occurred in 2003, it was not possible to determine the shuttle tanker DP class. 
Table 9: Incidents on the UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
Year Sector Phase Cause 
Type of incident 
DP 
class 
Near-
miss 
Collision Other 
1996 UK Loading DP failure  X  DP1 
1997 UK Loading Operator error  X  DP1 
1997 UK Loading PRS failure  X  DP1 
1997 UK Loading PRS failure   X DP1 
1998 UK Loading CPP failure   X DP1 
1998 UK Loading Operator error  X  DP1 
1999 UK Approach DP failure X   DP1 
1999 Norway Loading DP failure X   DP2 
1999 Norway Loading DP failure X   DP2 
1999 UK Disconnection FPSO thrusters tripped X   DP1 
2000 Norway Approach DP failure X   DP2 
2000 Norway Disconnection Manually initiated drive-off  X  DP2 
2000 UK Connection Operator error X   DP1 
2000 Norway Loading Operator error   X DP2 
2000 Norway Connection Technically initiated drive-off X   DP2 
2001 Norway Loading PRS/DP failure X   DP2 
2001 UK Loading Technically initiated drive-off X   DP1 
2002 UK Loading Engine failure   X DP1 
2002 UK Loading Rapid wind change X   DP1 
2003 UK Loading Technically initiated drive-off X   ? 
2004 Norway Loading DP failure X   DP2 
2006 Norway Connection Black-out  X  DP2 
2007 Norway Loading PRS failure   X DP2 
2008 Norway Loading Rapid wind change   X DP2 
2009 Norway Loading Engine failure   X DP2 
2009 Norway Connection Operator error X   DP2 
2009 UK Approach PRS-failure  X  DP2 
2011 Norway Loading CPP failure   X DP2 
Total    13 7 8  
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5.1.1 1995-2013 
In the period 1995-2013, there have been 28 reported incidents involving DP shuttle tankers 
performing tandem offloading from FPSO on the UKCS & NCS. As shown in Figure 21, the 
geographical distribution of the incidents is uniform, 14 incidents occurring on each of the 
continental shelves.  
 
Figure 21: Geographical distribution of incidents, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
Figure 22 shows the number of incidents per year on the UKCS & NCS, from 1995-2013. As 
seen from the figure, year 2013 represents no statistically significant change in the number of 
incidents compared to the last 10 years. It is worth noting that there has only been one incident 
during the last four years, and none during the last two years, which may indicate a minor 
improvement. 
 
Figure 22: Number of incidents per year, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
Figure 23 further shows the number of incidents per year on the UKCS & NCS, normalised per 
offloading. The incident frequency has been considerably reduced since its peak year in 1997 
(1.6E-02 incidents per offloading). It is not possible to determine if there has been a statistically 
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significant reduction in 2013, nonetheless it appears that the incident frequency has improved 
slightly.  
 
Figure 23: Number of incidents per offloading, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
The distribution of incidents between each operation phase, as presented in Figure 24 show that 
there is a predominance of incidents occurring during loading, representing approximately 68% 
(19/28) of the incidents. 
 
Figure 24: Number of incidents per operation phase, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
The distribution of incidents per failure cause on the UKCS & NCS, as presented in Figure 
25, shows that DP failure [21% (6/28)], PRS failure [18% (5/28)] and operator error [18% 
(5/28)] occur most frequent. 
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Figure 25: Number of incidents per failure cause, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
A further breakdown of the incidents according to their geographical distribution was made in 
order to investigate possible geographical differences. As shown in Figure 26, there is little 
variation between the two continental shelves in relation to which part of the operation the 
incidents occurred. Incidents have been prone to occur during the loading phase on both the 
UKCS and NCS, representing 71% (10/14) and 64% (9/14) respectively.  
 
Figure 26: Geographical distribution of incidents by operation phase, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
Moreover, Figure 27 presents the failure causes according to their geographical distribution. It 
shows that operator error has occurred more frequently on the UKCS, representing 21% (3/14) 
of the incidents versus 14% (2/14) on the NCS. PRS failures are distributed likewise, 
constituting 21% (3/14) on the UKCS and 14% (2/14) on the NCS. However, in the case of DP 
failure and manually initiated drive-offs, the number of incidents are considerably different. DP 
failure has been the cause of 14% (2/14) of the incidents on the UKCS, compared to 29% (4/14) 
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of the incidents on the NCS. Moreover, manually initiated drive-off has contributed to 7% 
(1/14) of the incidents on the NCS, whilst there are no such incidents reported on the UKCS.  
 
Figure 27: Geographical distribution of incidents per failure cause, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
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5.1.2 1995-2003 
There was reported a total of 20 incidents in the period 1995-2003, which constitutes more than 
two thirds [71% (20/28)] of the total number of incidents reported since 1995. Figure 28 shows 
the number of incidents per year on the UKCS & NCS, from 1995-2003. As seen from the 
figure, year 2003 represents no statistically significant change in the number of incidents 
compared to the previous eight years. Moreover, it shows that the absolute number of incidents 
per year increased towards year 2000, before declining in the three following years. 
 
Figure 28: Number of incidents per year, UKCS & NCS 1995-2003. 
Figure 29 further shows the number of incidents per offloading on the UKCS & NCS in the 
period 1995-2003. It is not possible to determine if there has been a statistically significant 
reduction in 2003, compared to the previous eight years. Nonetheless, it shows that the incident 
frequency per offloading was drastically reduced from 1997 to 1998, before declining further 
in each of the following years up to 2003. 
 
 
Figure 29: Number of incidents per offloading, UKCS & NCS 1995-2003. 
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The distribution of events between each operation phase, as presented in Figure 30, show that 
there is a predominance of incidents occurring during loading, representing 70% (14/20) of the 
incidents. The number of incidents occurring in the other operation phases is evenly distributed, 
representing 10% [2/20] each. 
 
Figure 30: Number of incidents per operation phase, UKCS & NCS 1995-2003. 
The distribution of incidents per failure cause on the UKCS & NCS, as presented in Figure 31, 
shows that DP failure [25% (5/20)] operator error [20% (4/20)] and PRS failure [15% (3/20)] 
occur most frequent. 
 
Figure 31: Number of incidents per failure cause, UKCS & NCS 1995-2003. 
In terms of their geographical distribution, as presented in Figure 32, the UKCS has the greater 
contribution to the number of incidents, representing 65% (13/20) of the incidents. The 
operation phase in which the incidents have occurred show little variation, with the exception 
that there has been more than twice the number of loading incidents on the UKCS compared to 
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the NCS. Furthermore, incidents have been prone to occur during the loading phase on both the 
UKCS and NCS, representing 77% (10/13) and 57% (4/7) respectively. 
 
Figure 32: Geographical distribution of incidents by operation phase, 1995-2003. 
Their geographical distribution of incidents per failure cause, as presented in Figure 33, shows 
that operator error has occurred more frequently on the UKCS, representing 23% (3/13) of the 
incidents, versus 14% (1/7) on the NCS. PRS failure is more evenly distributed, constituting 
15% (2/14) on the UKCS and 14% (1/14) on the NCS. However, in the case of DP failure, the 
proportions of incidents are considerably different. DP failure has been the cause of 15% (2/13) 
of the incidents on the UKCS, compared to 43% (3/7) of the incidents on the NCS.  
 
Figure 33: Geographical distribution of incidents per failure cause, 1995-2003. 
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5.1.3 2004-2013 
There were reported eight incidents in the period 2004-2013. As seen from Figure 34, which 
presents the number of incidents per year on the UKCS & NCS during the period, year 2013 
represents no statistically significant change in the number of incidents compared to the 
previous nine years. Moreover, the figure indicates no observable pattern in that the absolute 
number of incidents per year. 
 
Figure 34: Number of incidents per year, UKCS & NCS 2004-2013. 
Figure 35 shows the number of incidents per offloading on the UKCS & NCS in the period 
2004-2013. It is not possible to determine if there has been a statistically significant reduction 
in 2013, compared to the previous nine years, nor is it possible to observe any pattern for the 
frequency development during the period. 
 
Figure 35: Number of incidents per offloading, UKCS & NCS 2004-2013. 
The distribution of events between each operation phase, as presented in Figure 36, show that 
there is still a predominance of incidents occurring during loading, representing approximately 
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63% (5/8) of the incidents. However, the number of incidents occurring in the other operation 
phases is not so evenly distributed, as it was in the period 1995-2003. It is worth noting that 
there were no incidents during disconnection. 
 
Figure 36: Number of incidents per operation phase, UKCS & NCS 2004-2013. 
The distribution of incidents per failure cause on the UKCS & NCS, as presented in Figure 37, 
shows that PRS failure [25% (2/8)] occur most frequent. The rest of the incidents are evenly 
distributed among the different failure cause categories. It is worth noting that operator error 
has been reported as the failure cause in only one the event, which stands in stark contrast to 
the period 1995-2003. Moreover, there have been no cases of either technically nor manually 
initiated drive-offs, nor has there been any case of FPSO initiated incidents. 
 
Figure 37: Number of incidents per failure cause, UKCS & NCS 2004-2013. 
The geographical distribution, as presented in Figure 38, shows that the NCS has a considerably 
greater contribution to the number of incidents, representing 88% (7/8) of the incidents. 
Moreover, all of the incidents during the loading phase have occurred on the NCS, representing 
71% (5/7) of the NCS’s incidents.  
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Figure 38: Geographical distribution of incidents by operation phase, UKCS & NCS 2004-2013. 
The geographical distribution of the failure causes, as presented in Figure 39, shows that the 
incidents on the NCS are evenly distributed among the different failure causes. Thus, there is 
observed no predominant failure cause. 
 
Figure 39: Geographical distribution of incidents by operation phase, UKCS & NCS 2004-2013. 
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5.2 COLLISION FREQUENCY 
This section presents the results from a statistical analysis of all reported collision incidents on 
the UKCS and NCS in the period 1995-2013. The first part of the analysis comprises the entire 
period for the UKCS & NCS aggregated. The second part presents the results from analysing 
the UKCS and NCS separately. 
5.2.1 Overall collision frequency 
In the period 1995-2013, there have been reported seven collisions involving DP shuttle tankers 
performing tandem offloading from FPSO on the UKCS & NCS. Figure 40 presents the number 
of collisions on the UKCS & NCS, along with the year in which they occurred. The greatest 
number of collisions occurred in 1997. Moreover, there has not been reported any collisions 
during the last four years. However, it is not possible to observe any statistically significant 
increase/decrease for 2013 compared to the previous 10 years. 
 
Figure 40: Number of collisions per year, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
Figure 41 presents the number of collisions per offloading on the UKCS & NCS, calculated for 
each year from 1995-2013. As seen from the figure, 1996-1997 had the highest collision 
frequency when accounting for the number of offloading operations performed. Furthermore, 
although one collision occurred in each of the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2006 and 2009, the 
number of collisions per offloading is considerably higher for 1996 than the rest. This highlights 
the importance of accounting for the number of offloading operations performed. 
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Figure 41: Number of collisions per offloading, UKCS & NCS 1995-2013. 
Probabilities for events related to collisions during FPSO – shuttle tanker tandem offloading, 
estimated from UKCS and NCS incidents aggregated, is presented in Table 10. Although 
presented as probabilities, they should rather be interpreted as event frequencies. This also 
applies to the probabilities presented in Table 11 and Table 12.  
As shown in Table 10, both the drive-off frequency and the collision frequency have been 
reduced, when comparing 1995-2003 versus 2004-2013. The drive-off frequency has been 
reduced by 76% (3.8E-03 vs. 9.0E-04) and the collision frequency has been reduced by 63% 
(1.2E-03 vs. 4.5E-04). However, the probability of failure of recovery given a drive-off has 
already occurred, has increased by 61% (3.1E-01 vs. 5.0E-01).  
Table 10: Incident frequency per offloading for collisions and related events, UKCS & NCS. 
Period Pr(drive-off) Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) Pr(collision) 
1995-2013 2.3E-03 3.5E-01 8.0E-04 
1995-2003 3.8E-03 3.1E-01 1.2E-03 
2004-2013 9.0E-04 5.0E-01 4.5E-04 
    
The geographical distribution of collisions on the UKCS & NCS, as presented in Figure 43, 
shows that in the period 1995-2013, the UKCS  has had more than twice the number of 
collisions compared to the NCS (five vs. two collisions respectively). Hence, the UKCS 
represents 71% (5/7) of the total number of collisions on the UKCS & NCS. The greater part 
of these collisions occurred between 1995 and 2003. In this period, the UKCS had four 
collisions, representing 80% (4/5) of the total number. However, in the following period, from 
2004-2013, only one collision occurred on each of the continental shelves. 
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Figure 42: Geographical distribution of collisions, for selected time periods. 
5.2.2 NCS 
Table 11 shows the probabilities for the events related to collisions during FPSO – shuttle tanker 
tandem offloading, estimated from NCS incidents only. It shows a reduction of nearly 64% 
(3.9E-03 vs. 1.4E-03) for the drive-off frequency and a reduction of more than 29% (6.5E-04 
vs. 4.6E-04) for the collision frequency, when comparing 1995-2003 versus 2004-2013. 
However, the probability of failure of recovery given a drive-off has already occurred has 
increased by 94% (1.7E-01 vs. 3.3.E-01). 
Table 11: Incident frequency per offloading for collisions and related events, NCS. 
Period Pr(drive-off) Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) Pr(collision) 
1995-2013 2.7E-03 2.0E-01 5.4E-04 
1995-2003 3.9E-03 1.7E-01 6.5E-04 
2004-2013 1.4E-03 3.3E-01 4.6E-04 
 
5.2.3 UKCS 
Table 12 shows the probabilities for the events related to collisions during FPSO – shuttle tanker 
tandem offloading, estimated from UKCS incidents only. It shows a reduction of 88% (3.7E-
03 vs. 4.4E-04) for the drive-off frequency and a reduction of close to 71% (1.5E-03 vs. 4.4E-
04) for the collision frequency, when comparing 1995-2003 versus 2004-2013. In contrast, the 
probability of failure of recovery given a drive-off has already occurred, shows an increase of 
150% (4.0E-01 vs. 1.0E+00). 
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Table 12: Incident frequency per offloading for collisions and related events, UKCS. 
Period Pr(drive-off) Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) Pr(collision) 
1995-2013 2.2E-03 4.5E-01 1.0E-03 
1995-2003 3.7E-03 4.0E-01 1.5E-03 
2004-2013 4.4E-04 1.0E+00 4.4E-04 
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6. DISCUSSION 
The following discussion is divided into three parts. The first part concerns the results from the 
thesis’ risk assessment, the second part concerns possible ways to reduce the risk in tandem 
offloading operations significantly, the last part concerns the methods applied in this thesis. 
6.1 RESULTS: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN RELATION TO THE COLLISION 
FREQUENCY 
This thesis set out to investigate the current situation in relation to the collision frequency, in 
tandem offloading operations between FPSO and shuttle tanker in the North Sea. Moreover, it 
sought to assess possible trends and developments for the incident frequencies, following the 
conclusion of the JIP project “FPSO Operational safety”. In the following, the time periods 
1995-2003 and 2004-2013, are referred to as ‘period 1’ and ‘period 2’ respectively. Moreover, 
FPSO/FSU is referred to as FPSO. 
In relation to the overall incident frequency, this thesis finds that there has been 28 incidents 
involving DP shuttle tankers performing offloading from FPSO, on the UKCS & NCS from 
1995 to 2013. There have been reported at least one incident each year from 1996 to 2004, and 
from 2006 to 2009, and the last reported incident occurred in 2011. However, more than two 
thirds of the incidents (20 out of 28 incidents) occurred in period 1. Hence, the results show 
that there has been a reduction in the absolute number of incidents since 2003. Moreover, the 
results from the statistical analysis of the incidents suggest that there have also been an 
improvement in the incident frequency per offloading since 2003. It is however not possible to 
observe a statistically significant reduction in the incident frequency. The reason for this result 
may be that the total number of incidents in the analysis is too small for one to observe a 
statistically significant trend. 
The distribution of incidents between each operations phase shows a predominance of incidents 
occurring during the loading phase on both the UKCS and NCS, and the predominance was 
observable in data for both period 1 and period 2. Thus, the loading phase confirms its position 
as the most vulnerable in terms of incidents occurring. However, considering the time spent in 
each operations phase, the loading phase commonly representing 80-90% of an offloading 
operation`s total duration, the result may not be that surprising. Still, a DP shuttle tanker is in 
auto DP mode during the loading phase, yielding that problems relating to the positioning 
system may be relevant. This suspicion is confirmed by investigation of the failure causes, the 
most common being ‘DP failure’, ‘PRS failure’ and ‘operator error’. This result complies with 
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that of (Vinnem et al., 2003a), which found the RIFs ‘Shuttle tanker positioning and control 
system’ and ‘Shuttle tanker crew competence’, to be major contributing factors in their 
investigation of tandem offloading incidents that had occurred between 1995 and 2002. It 
should however be noted that this thesis applies similar incident data for period 1.  
There are notable differences between period 1 and period 2, in terms of failure causes. The 
failure cause ‘operator error’, which occurs in four incidents in period 1, only occurs in one 
incident in period 2. This may indicate that the competence level of the DPOs has improved. 
However, there is also a reduction in the number of incidents involving ‘DP failure’, five 
incidents in period 1 versus one incident in period 2. Thus, it may be that improvements to the 
DP system, both in terms of technical reliability and HMI, have caused both reductions. The 
evidence is inconclusive. The incident data further indicates that ‘manually initiated drive off’ 
has only occurred on the NCS. However, the last mentioned might be due to different 
terminologies being applied to describe the failure, e.g. a failure cause that was classified as an 
operator error in the UKCS reports, might have been classified as a manually initiated drive-
off in NCS reports.  
A closer investigation of the results reveals some possible issues relating to the quality of the 
incident data for the UKCS in period 2. The incident data indicates that there has only occurred 
one incident on the UKCS in the last 10 years (since 2003), which is highly suspicious 
considering that there are 13 reported incidents on the UKCS in the preceding nine years. This 
implies a reduction in the number of incidents of more than 92%. In comparison, on the NCS 
there are reported seven incidents in each of the corresponding time periods. The suspicion 
towards the correctness of the number of incidents on the UKCS in period 2 increases further 
if the number of offloadings is taken into consideration. For period 2, it yields a difference 
between the UKCS and NCS in the incident frequency per offloading, of nearly 88% (3.2E-03 
for the NCS vs. 4.0E-04 for the UKCS). In contrast, for period 1, the difference the NCS and 
UKCS in incident frequency per offloading is 4% (4.6E-03 vs. 4.8E-03). Thus, the result 
indicates a strange difference in the development between the two continental shelves. 
In relation to collision incidents, this thesis finds that there have been seven collisions involving 
DP shuttle tankers performing offloading from FPSO on the UKCS & NCS from 1995 to 2013, 
and more than two thirds of the collisions (five vs. two collisions) occurs in period 1. Hence, 
the results show that there has been a reduction in the absolute number of collisions since 2003. 
The results from the statistical analysis of the collisions further suggest that there have been an 
improvement in the collision frequency since 2003. It is however not possible to observe a 
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statistically significant reduction in the collision frequency. As for the incident frequency 
analysis, the reason for this result may be that the total number of incidents in the analysis is 
too small for one to observe a statistically significant trend.  
Based on all incidents from 1995 to 2013, the collision frequency for the UKCS & NCS is 
estimated to 8.0E-04 per offloading. Only including incidents from period 2, the collision 
frequency is estimated to 4.5E-04 per offloading. As a conservative estimate, the collision 
frequency for the UKCS & NCS aggregated per mid-2014, is estimated to lie the range of 4.5E-
04 to 8.0E-04 per offloading, equivalent to one collision in every 2222 to 1250 offloadings. 
Assuming that an FPSO is offloaded 50 times per year, the collision frequency is further 
estimated to lie in the range of 2.3E-02 to 4.0E-02 per year. This corresponds to one collision 
every 25 to 45 years. It should however be noted that the collision frequency is likely to be in 
the lower region of the aforementioned intervals. 
Further, when investigating the two continental shelves separately, estimates for the collision 
frequency shows consistency. Analysis of the NCS and UKCS s separately shows that a 
conservative estimate for the collision frequency lie in the range of 4.6E-04 to 5.4E-04 per 
offloading for the NCS and in the range of 4.4E-04 to 1.0E-03 per offloading for the UKCS. In 
comparison, (Chen, 2003) estimated the collision frequency to be 3.1E-03 per offloading. Thus, 
this thesis’ presents lower estimates for the collision frequency. Still, the frequency estimates 
of this thesis appear reasonable, as incident data show a decreasing trend in the number of 
incidents in the last 10 years.  
Furthermore, as presented in Section 3.2.1, the cut-off criterion for design loads applicable to 
offshore installations on the NCS, has been set to a frequency of 1.0E-04 accidents per platform 
year. Assuming once more that an FPSO is offloaded 50 times per year, the collision frequency 
per year for the NCS lies in the range of 2.3E-02 to 2.7E-02. Hence, the accident frequency of 
FPSOs on the NCS is more than two decades higher than the required frequency. This further 
implies that the FPSOs have to be designed to withstand the collision impact of a shuttle tanker. 
The investigation of the Navion Hispania collision with Njord B FSU revealed that the collision 
energy was about 61 MJ. Yet, the regulations only explicitly require that the FPSO should be 
designed against an impact load no of less than 14 MJ. It is up to the operators themselves to 
determine if a greater design load is necessary. Thus, it is the author’s opinion that the current 
regulations fail to address the collision risk adequately between FPSO and shuttle tanker. As 
pointed out by (Kvitrud et al., 2012), a design load in the order of magnitude 50-100 MJ is often 
more appropriate.  
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The drive-off frequency shows a substantial improvement when comparing period 1 and period 
2. Based on all incidents from 1995 to 2013, the drive-off frequency for UKCS & NCS is 
estimated to be 2.3E-03 per offloading. Only including incidents from period 2, the drive-off 
frequency is estimated to be 9.0E-04 per offloading. As a conservative estimate, the drive-off 
frequency for the UKCS & NCS aggregated, per mid-2014, is estimated to lie in the range of 
9.0E-04 to 2.3E-03 per offloading. These estimates are lower than that of (Chen, 2003), which 
found the drive-off frequency to lie in the range of 5.4E-03 to 2.0E-02. However, considering 
the considerable efforts that have been made to reduce the collision risk since their study was 
performed, this thesis’ estimates appear reasonable. As in the case of the collision frequency, it 
should be noted that the drive-off frequency is likely to be in the lower region of the 
aforementioned intervals. 
However, the probability of failure of recovery given a drive-off has already occurred, 
Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off), shows an increase in period 2, compared to period 1. In other 
words, the probability of successful recovery action upon a drive-off incident has decreased. 
This could imply that the reduction in the collision frequency is due to an improved robustness 
in relation to the initiation of drive-off events, and that the issues relating to recovery actions 
remain unresolved. Considering the possibility of there being a degree of underreporting to the 
incident databases, the increase can of course be the result of collisions being reported to a 
higher degree than near-miss incidents. Still, the estimated frequencies for UKCS, NCS, as well 
as the UKCS & NCS aggregated, all indicate an increase for Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) 
in period 2. The evidence is inconclusive. 
Based on all incidents from 1995 to 2013, Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) for the UKCS & 
NCS is estimated to 3.5E-01. Only including incidents from period 2, the collision frequency 
is estimated to 5.0E-01. Hence, Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) for the UKCS & NCS 
aggregated, per mid-2014, is estimated to lie in the range of 3.5E-01 to 5.0E-01. This estimate 
is comparable to that of (Chen and Moan, 2004), which estimated Pr(failure of recovery|drive-
off) to be in the range of 3.5E-01 to 7.6E-01, for a shuttle tanker having a separation distance 
of 80m to the FPSO. However, their estimates were based on a human reaction time model, 
which applied reaction time estimates from shuttle tanker captains and DPOs, along with the 
lognormal distribution. Hence, the basis for the two studies’ estimates is different. Nevertheless, 
this thesis’ estimate lies well within the estimate of (Chen and Moan, 2004) and thus appears 
reasonable. 
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6.2 MEASURES FOR REDUCING THE COLLISION FREQUENCY 
Overall, risk mitigation measures for avoiding drive-off incidents resulting in a collision, are 
concerned with either avoiding a drive-off from occurring in the first place (initiation), or 
increasing the chance of successful recovery after a drive-off has been initiated (recovery). The 
risk mitigation measures may be targeted at the crew, technical systems employed onboard the 
vessels during offloading operations, the vessels themselves, or the field configuration. 
Moreover, the effect of the risk mitigation measures may be enhanced if several measures are 
applied in combination. 
Previous studies and guidelines have proposed several measures for reducing the collision risk. 
E.g., (Vinnem et al., 2003b, Vinnem et al., 2003a, Chen, 2003, Chen and Moan, 2005, Chen, 
2013) proposed measures, which included among other: 
- Automatic initiation of recovery action by the DP system. 
- Facilitating early detection and identification of drive-off by the DP system and/or DPO. 
- Increasing the relative distance between FPSO and shuttle tanker. 
- Joint emergency procedures for FPSO and shuttle tanker, e.g. the FPSO turning its stern 
in one direction and the shuttle tanker turning its bow the other way. 
- Avoiding failure prone situations, e.g. situations where there are excessive surge/sway 
movements between the vessels. 
- Selecting the vessels’ outfitting so that they are better equipped in terms of successfully 
managing drive-off events, or in way that reduces the chance of a drive-off occurring in 
the first place. E.g. by increasing the vessel`s thruster power, manoeuvring capabilities, 
DP system reliability, etc. 
The following discussion is concerned with possible measures for significantly reducing the 
collision risk in FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading operations, considering a drive-off scenario. In 
this relation, the author finds the following issues especially important to address: 
 Ensuring that there is sufficient time for initiating successful recovery action.  
 Ensuring that the DPOs’ competence level is adequate. 
 Facilitating successful recovery by cooperation between the shuttle tanker and FPSO.  
 Facilitating successful recovery by altering the field configuration. 
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Ensuring there is enough time for initiating successful recovery action 
Senior instructors at SMSC, mentioned the following factors to have the greatest influence on 
the DPO`s reaction time when facing a drive-off scenario (SMSC, 2014):  
1) The duration of time that the operator has been on active watch duty. 
2) The operator`s level of experience. 
3) The complexity of the DP system. 
The first factor can be addressed by introducing a stricter requirement for the maximum length 
of continuous watch duty for the DPOs. As presented in Section 3.2.2, the intensity and duration 
of mental work, time of the day the work is performed, as well as the operator’s prior amount 
of sleep, are of decisive importance for human fatigue. Hence, work-rest cycles can have a 
significant influence on human performance in a drive-off scenario. (Grech et al., 2008) states 
that while the evidence is not conclusive, there is a tendency for increased risk of incidents and 
errors when the duration of shifts exceeds eight hours, and when work is performed at night. 
Considering that offloading operations commonly has a duration of 20 hours, it is evident that 
a single DPO should not be on continuous watch-keeping duty for the entire operation. Better-
designed shift schedules and fatigue management programs, as suggested by (Grech et al., 
2008), may be effective countermeasures against fatigue from lengthy working hours. In 
relation to night work, the simplest remedy would be only to perform offloading operations 
during daytime. However, the long duration of an offloading operation makes it practically 
impossible to comply fully with the aforementioned. Still, planning the operation so that the 
most critical phase of the operation, i.e. the loading phase, is performed in daytime may 
effectively reduce the risk.  
Another option could be to require the DP shuttle tanker to have two DPOs on the bridge at all 
times during offloading operations. This could enable better work-rest cycles, as the two DPOs 
can have shorter hours of continuous high concentration work on active watch-duty. 
Additionally, by rotating between being on active watch-duty and observing, the two DPOs 
collective performance may increase. Two of the biggest actors in North Sea, Teekay and 
Statoil, have already introduced this kind of work arrangement, requiring two DPOs to be 
present at the bridge during offloading operations. Their watch schedule rotation is 1 hour on 
active watch duty and 1 hour in standby (SMSC, 2014).  
A dual DPO work arrangement may also address the second factor, operator`s level of 
experience. If there is only one DPO present at the shuttle tanker bridge, the vessel is more or 
less entirely dependent on his recovery actions in terms of avoiding a collision. However, by 
6. Discussion 
85 
having two DPOs present on the bridge, the impact of a single DPO`s alertness and experience 
on the collision probability, may be reduced. A less experienced DPO may perform operations 
under the supervision of a more experienced one. Thus, such an arrangement can have a positive 
influence on the overall competence level of DPOs. Furthermore, if needed, the two DPOs can 
offer each other inputs and advice on what to do, which can be extremely important in high 
stress situations, e.g. a drive-off scenario. What is more, if one looks to the aviation industry, 
there is in fact a requirement for a pilot and a co-pilot on all commercial flights, in order to 
increase the reliability of the human operator. The two pilots alternate between the roles of 
controlling and monitoring the flight. Thus, the rationale for requiring a dual operator work 
arrangement, have already been recognized by other industries and the marine industry ought 
to consider doing likewise. 
The third factor, DP system`s complexity, is a highly relevant issue as today`s DP systems are 
becoming far more advanced and require more extensive training of the operators than 
previously. E.g., there are more alarm systems and the general complexity of the DP controller 
has increased. As one of the instructors at SMSC described it, the first DP systems only had an 
On/Off switch, whilst today`s systems have numerous DP settings and operational modes 
(SMSC, 2014). Thus, it is relevant to raise questions about this development. Is it possible that 
the DP system`s controller interface has become too advanced for the people operating them? 
If this is the case, then it is critical that the DP system developers address the issue, ensuring 
that the there is a stronger focus on HMI in the development process of the DP system. E.g., 
the controllers and software ought to be designed not only for intuitive operability during 
normal operations, but also for operational deviations.  
Furthermore, there are numerous unique alarm systems onboard ships, which can be a problem 
to the operator due to their loudness and triggering frequency. In (SMSC, 2014) it was 
mentioned that it was common for DPOs to experience situations where non-critical alarms are 
triggered, often involving numerous alarms sounding at the same time. This can cause the DPOs 
to become overwhelmed, which can further cause them to pay less attention to, or even ignore 
alarms. In addition, numerous alarms, both critical and non-critical, occurring simultaneously 
can also make it more difficult to identify which alarm must to be responded to first. (Grech et 
al., 2008) suggested a countermeasure to this, an approach that involves matching the alarms 
saliency to their criticality for the system. This can be a simple, yet effective, measure 
facilitating a faster response by the DPO in a drive-off scenario. 
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Ensuring that the DPOs’ competence level is adequate. 
The DPOs’ competence level is of course a major factor when performing operations in close 
proximity to another vessel. Hence, the training of personnel should be a high priority for shuttle 
tanker operators. However, this can be a challenge as some companies are pressing to reduce 
the amount of training for their personnel. Compared to the NI DPO certification, the new DNV 
DPO certification effectively reduces the amount of formal training required to become a 
certified DPO. It is thus relevant to consider the possible implications of reducing formal 
training requirements, as the DP systems onboard the shuttle tankers are becoming more 
advanced. As some companies are already pressing for the training to be shortened, it may be 
argued that it has become even more crucial that the institutions responsible for educating DPOs 
remain faithful to their responsibility for up-keeping formal competence standards. This implies 
ensuring that their students are not only able to fulfil the certification standards in terms of test 
results, but that they are also capable of applying their skills and knowledge in actual operations. 
This can require numerous hours of simulation training for unexperienced students. 
Furthermore, as offloading operations do not normally require the DPO to perform emergency 
actions, it is necessary also for experienced personnel to undergo simulator training of such 
events on a regular basis to maintain their skillset. 
Another issue is the possibility that the DP system`s sophistication is causing the DPOs to 
become too reliant on the DP system. During tandem offloading operations, it is not uncommon 
for the DPO having to use manual control, e.g. due to a faulty DP or operational requirements. 
Further, in a drive-off scenario there are several challenges for the DPO to conquer, in a very 
limited time, in order to have a successful recovery of the shuttle tanker. Thus, providing the 
DPOs with an in-depth understanding of the of the DP system working and limitations should 
be a key objective in the education of DPOs. 
Facilitating successful recovery by cooperation between the shuttle tanker and FPSO. 
(Daughdrill and Clark, 2002) suggests that when shuttle tankers and FPSOs are performing 
offloading operations, they ought to be considered as a system rather than two distinct entities. 
Applying this perspective, a natural suggestion would be to incorporate this in the offloading 
procedures, i.e. ensuring that system performance specifications and operations manuals 
consider the various interactions between the FPSO and the shuttle tanker. Although IMCA 
recommends for joint emergency procedures for the shuttle tanker and FPSO, (SMSC, 2014) 
states that according to their experience, it is in fact uncommon for such procedures to be in 
place. Further, it has been a challenge that the crew aboard the FPSO and shuttle tanker does 
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not have any in-depth understanding of the counterpart`s operations. On the other hand, (SMSC, 
n.d.) states that it has recently been a  development in the training of DP operators, where the 
oil companies have started to require joint training for crew onboard shuttle tankers and FPSOs. 
Thus, some measures are being made to address the issue, which can ultimately facilitate better 
cooperation, and an understanding of the operational activities and problems facing their 
counterpart in tandem offloading. Still, there is potential for improvement on the issue of 
cooperation between shuttle tanker and FPSO. As previously mentioned, the issue has been 
presented in previous studies on the subject. However, it seems that the industry has failed to 
address it adequately. Thus, this thesis recommends once more that joint emergency procedures 
for FPSO and shuttle tanker ought to be established. 
Facilitating successful recovery by altering the field configuration 
A fundamental hazard of the tandem offloading operations from FPSO to shuttle tanker, is that 
the traditional tandem configuration involves the shuttle tanker having its bow heading in the 
direction of the FPSO`s stern. This is not ideal, considering the possibility of a drive-off forward 
scenario. The relative separation distance between the shuttle tanker and FPSO is small, hence 
the shuttle tanker`s chance of stopping the forward motion or steering clear of the FPSO is 
limited. However, with the introduction of geostationary FPSOs in the North Sea, a new 
offloading configuration concept has been proposed. The concept involves the shuttle tanker 
maintaining a small heading difference to the FPSO, so that its bow is only heading towards the 
FPSO in short periods.(Chen et al., 2010, Chen, 2013) presented the ‘direct offloading’ 
configuration and provided an assessment of the collision risk when applying such a 
configuration in offloading operations from a geostationary FPSO, i.e. a FPSO that is, in 
contrast to a weather-vaning FPSO, spread moored. This thesis suggests that one should 
investigate the possibility for applying the same configuration to ship-shaped FPSOs.  
Figure 43 provides an illustration of the direct offloading configuration applied to shuttle tanker 
offloading from a ship-shaped FPSO. The green sector is the loading sector, in which the shuttle 
tanker weathervanes whilst offloading. The blue sector is the pickup zone, in which the shuttle 
tanker can be positioned to receive the messenger line from the FPSO. The yellow sector is a 
“barrier sector”, i.e. if the shuttle tanker comes within this sector, it indicates that the vessel is 
experiencing station-keeping problems. The red lines marks the end of the minimum/maximum 
excursion limits for the shuttle tanker`s relative separation distance during offloading. If this 
line is breached, the shuttle tanker has a position loss (Chen et al., 2010). 
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Figure 43: Illustration of offloading between shuttle tanker and ship-shaped FPSO, using direct offloading configuration. 
Adapted from (Chen and Moan, 2004). 
Moreover, as seen from the figure, the concept differs from regular tandem offloading 
configuration in several ways; the shuttle tanker has a heading pivot point which is positioned 
sideways of the FPSO; it has a substantially longer separation distance (150-250m vs. 70-
100m); and the shuttle tanker will change its heading pivot point when needed. The possibility 
to change the shuttle tankers heading pivot point when needed enables the shuttle tanker to 
utilise more of its loading sector. Hence, the disadvantage relating to position keeping, from 
not being positioned directly behind the FPSO, is offset. 
In theory, the direct offloading configuration offers several advantages relative to regular 
tandem offloading configuration: Firstly, a larger separation distance implies a longer time 
window to detect and initiate recovery action upon a drive-off forward. (Chen and Moan, 2004) 
found that by increasing the relative separation distance from 80 to 250m, the time window 
increases from 53 seconds to 3 minutes. Resultantly, this is found to increase the probability of 
successful recovery from 2.5E-01 to 9.0E-01, i.e. Pr(collision|drive-off) is reduced to 1.0E-01 
(1.0E+00 – 9.0E-01).  
Secondly, by moving the heading pivot point away from the FPSO`s stern and to the side, the 
shuttle tanker is not heading towards the FPSO for the majority of an offloading`s duration. 
This may have a substantial effect on the collision risk as the vessels are only on a collision 
course in short time periods, opposed to the entire duration offloading operation. Figure 44 
provides an illustration of the collision potential in a drive-off forward scenario, as well as the 
process of the shuttle tanker changing its heading pivot point. In a drive-off scenario, the shuttle 
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tanker would already have a heading deviation to the FPSO (assuming that the drive-off does 
not occur whilst changing the heading pivot point). Thus, shuttle tanker could simply steer away 
from the FPSO. Moreover, if the heading deviation is sufficient, it may not be necessary for the 
DPO to intervene in order to avoid a collision. Hence, the risk reducing potential from applying 
direct offloading configuration is seemingly considerable.  
The shuttle tanker will only be heading towards the FPSO whilst changing the heading pivot 
point, an operation which (Chen and Moan, 2004) estimated to last 10 minutes and that would 
have to be performed one or two times during an offloading operation. The aforementioned 
information can be applied to estimate the drive-off frequency and collision frequency if using 
direct offloading configuration instead of tandem configuration.  
 
Figure 44: Collision potential in drive-off scenario and illustration of shuttle tanker changing the heading pivot point. 
Adapted from (Chen and Moan, 2004, Chen, 2013). 
In order to provide a conservative estimate of the exposure time, (Chen and Moan, 2004) 
assumed four changes of heading pivot point per offloading operation when estimating drive-
off and collision frequencies. Thus, the shuttle tanker will be heading towards the FPSO for 40 
minutes per offloading. The frequencies for the NCS & UKCS aggregated can be estimated by 
equation (5) and equation (6): 
 Pr(𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑓, 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) =  Pr (𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑓, 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚) ∙
2
3
 (5) 
 Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) =  Pr(𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑓, 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡) ∙ (1 − 0.9) (6) 
6. Discussion 
 
90 
The new frequency estimates are based on the results from this thesis’ incident analysis, as 
presented in Section 6.1, along with information from (Chen and Moan, 2004). The resulting 
estimates for the frequencies are presented along with the result of this thesis’ analysis, in Table 
13. 
Table 13: Frequency estimates for tandem and direct offloading configuration, UKCS & NCS aggregated. 
 Tandem configuration Direct configuration 
Pr(Drive-off) 9.0E-04 to 2.3E-03 6.0E-04 to 1.6E-03 
Pr(collision|drive-off) 4.0E-01 to 5.0E-01 1.0E-01 
Pr(Collision) 4.5E-04 to 8.0E-04 6.0E-05 to 1.6E-04 
Hence, the drive-off frequency is estimated to be reduced by 33% and the collision frequency 
is estimated to be reduced by nearly 80-87%, if direct configuration is applied instead of tandem 
configuration. This suggests that there are possibilities for achieving a significant reduction of 
the collision frequency by applying direct configuration instead of tandem configuration. 
However, there may be issues related to applying such a configuration on a ship-shaped FPSO. 
Firstly, in order to use direct offloading configuration on a ship shaped FPSO, it is necessary 
that for it to have thrusters. Although all FPSOs on the NCS have such, there are several FPSOs 
on the UKCS that applies free weather-vaning, and hence they are not equipped with thrusters. 
Hence, those FPSOs will have to be modified in order for them to apply such a configuration. 
Secondly, the heading deviation might be a concern to shuttle tankers performing offloading 
from ship-shaped FPSOs, since shuttle tankers are very vulnerable to position-loss in situations 
where there is excessive relative surge and yaw motions between the vessels. In contrast, a 
geostationary circular FPSO will not experience surge and yaw motions, due to its geometrical 
shape and it being geostationary, i.e. large fishtailing and surging motions are not possible 
(Solhaug, 2009). As the studies on the new direct offloading concept has been focusing on 
geostationary circular FPSOs, more research is needed in order to determine the feasibility of 
applying the concept on ship-shaped FPSOs. 
Thirdly, position-keeping problems may arise because either of the vessels has to maintain a 
less than optimal heading, i.e. both the FPSO and shuttle cannot select the optimal heading 
considering the environmental forces and the vessels relative motions, as that would imply 
tandem configuration. As the operational envelope for tandem offloading in DP mode is already 
limited by the shuttle tanker`s station-keeping capabilities, i.e. there are maximum limitations 
for wave heights and wind, the impact on the operational envelope may be a concern. 
Nonetheless, it is rarely that current, wind and waves are all coming in the same direction. 
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Hence it may be possible for the shuttle tanker to select a suboptimal heading without it having 
too much of an effect on the vessel`s motions. Moreover, if the shuttle tanker and FPSO are 
provided with adequate capabilities for handling the extra environmental forces inflicted, it may 
be a feasible option to apply the direct offloading configuration in operations between ship-
shaped FPSO and shuttle tanker. 
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6.3 METHODS 
As this thesis is intended to provide an update on the current situation of the collision risk in 
tandem offloading operations between FPSO and DP shuttle tanker in the North Sea, the author 
found it appropriate to select an analytical approach that is consistent with the previously 
published research in the field. Hence, the approach was selected with the intention of 
facilitating comparison and verification of the results. This thesis’ analyses the collision risk 
using both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis methods. 
As the scientific area of HOFs is vast, it is thus not possible to cover all HOF aspects of the 
collision risk within the workload intended for a master thesis. However, by addressing factors 
found to be the most critical in previous studies, this thesis’ should provide insight into core 
factors which can influence the collision risk. The main changes to tandem offloading 
operations between FPSO and shuttle tanker, since the JIP project report was published in 2003, 
are related to developments of new technology and corresponding changes in the education of 
DPOs, e.g. developments in DP system functionality. However, the field configuration, e.g. 
relative separation distance between FPSO and shuttle tanker, has not changed radically. Hence, 
the basis for selecting which HOFs to address should still be relevant. 
The theoretical basis for this thesis’ analysis of HOFs and technical factors is the socio-technical 
model, i.e. a system approach. The methodology was selected based on the author finding the 
system approach to be the better-suited approach for investigating the collision risk, as tandem 
offloading operations are complex and dependent on numerous human and organisational 
factors. Moreover, the larger share of those factors are dependent on external conditions (i.e. 
conditions of the workers surroundings), e.g. education and training of personnel, working 
environment, procedures. As stated by (Reason, 2000) a personal approach to HOFs more or 
less isolates the unsafe acts from their system context, often overlooking the reoccurring 
patterns of unsafe acts. Moreover, recent findings have revealed that the human element`s 
position in a larger system, is critical for the understanding of accident mechanisms and incident 
mechanisms (Grech et al., 2008). 
The quantitative analysis involved a statistical analysis of reported FPSO-shuttle tanker tandem 
offloading incidents on the UKCS & NCS from 1995-2013. Overall incident frequencies and 
collision frequencies were estimated based on the frequency model of (Chen and Moan, 2004). 
The rationale behind the model as well as the process of obtaining input data for the model was 
discussed in Section 4.3.4. 
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Risk analysis is no exact science and thus results will vary depending on numerous factors, e.g. 
approach, availability of information, etc. Moreover, in relation to risk management, risk 
analysis should aid in the process of reducing risk levels for the future. Although statistical 
analysis is based on assessment of historical data, it enables one to quantify historical 
developments for the risk elements investigated. The last mentioned has off course a limitation 
in that one must assume that the data is representative for all new installations and vessels. 
Nevertheless, statistical analysis can be a practical method in making predictions about future 
risk levels based current risk levels. Furthermore, as statistical analysis enables one to 
investigate the frequency of events, it may enhance the accuracy when comparing one`s own 
results against the results from previous studies. 
Determining which FPSOs that should be included in analysis of the incident frequencies was 
a challenging task. As this thesis investigates the collision risk between FPSO and DP shuttle 
tanker in tandem offloading, it was necessary to identify the fields that apply such a offloading 
configuration. This was a simple task for the NCS as the information is readily available. 
However, for the UKCS the information had to be retrieved through extensive research in 
several online databases. This involved identifying which FPSOs that applies tandem 
offloading, and then try to identify the associated shuttle tankers performing offloading. The 
author did his outmost to verify that only fields applying DP shuttle tankers are included in the 
analysis.  
The statistical data analysis of the incidents presented a major challenge, as the quantity and 
quality of data, i.e. the amount of detailed and publically available information on incidents 
involving FPSO-shuttle tanker performing offloading operations, is limited for recent years. In 
this relation, the reporting bias is highly important. In the context of this thesis’ empirical 
research, reporting bias refers to a tendency for underreporting of incidents, which was 
discussed in Section 4.1. 
The author of this thesis has done his outmost to ensure that the results presented are 
representable, which has included researching and comparing incident data of multiple 
statistical sources. It would have been desirable to have direct access to incident databases, e.g. 
the IMCA database on DP vessels or DNV`s WOAD database, in order to be able to verify that 
all reported incidents have been included in the analysis. Several requests for access to such 
databases were made; however, the attempts were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, through 
extensive investigation of incident reports published by UK and Norwegian governmental 
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bodies, it was possible to present a list of all publicly disclosed incidents. It should however be 
noted that the number of incidents identified for the UKCS in the period from 2004-2013, is 
very limited (only one reported incident). Thus, there is uncertainty associated with the data 
basis for the statistical analysis. 
The uncertainty relating to the completeness of the incident database has further implications 
for the estimated collision and incident probabilities. The probabilities relating to the frequency 
of drive-off incidents and likelihood of successful recovery, i.e. 𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀)  and 
𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀)  respectively, may be influenced by the aforementioned uncertainty. It is 
however difficult to quantify the exact magnitude of the resulting error for the probabilities. 
However, if there had been reported five more drive-off incidents on the UKCS from 1995-
2013, 𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀)  would increase by 24.8% (2.9E-03 vs. 2.3E-03) and 𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) 
would decrease by 20% (2.8E-01 vs. 3.5E-01). Thus, these estimated probabilities should be 
only be treated as indicative estimates for the order of size for factual probabilities. 
Conversely, in the case of collision incidents, it would not be so easy to hide the fact that an 
incident has occurred, as a collision is likely to result in visible damage to the vessels. Thus, it  
is the author`s opinion, that the uncertainty of the estimated collision probability, 
𝑃𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛), is less than for the other probability estimates, as  𝑃𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) also can be 
calculated independently8 of 𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀) and 𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑂𝑅|𝑈𝑃𝐹𝑀).  
                                               
8 See section 4.3.4. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has provided an assessment of the collision risk in tandem offloading operations 
between FPSO and shuttle tanker in the North Sea. The risk has been analysed using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, and the results from the analysis have been discussed. 
Moreover, measures for reducing the collision frequency have been proposed. This chapter 
presents this thesis’ conclusions and recommendations for further work. 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Has the collision frequency been reduced since the conclusion of the JIP project ‘Operational 
Safety of FPSOs’ in 2003? Moreover, is it possible to reduce the frequency of such incidents 
significantly? The findings of this thesis suggest that the answer to both questions is yes. 
Several studies relating to the collision risk in FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading operations have 
been performed post the conclusion of the JIP project. The research is seemingly mainly 
concerned with further work regarding the risk elements that were identified in the JIP project 
and the PhD thesis of Dr. Ing. Haibo Chen, as well as providing updated statistics on incidents 
and risk levels. 
The risks involved in FPSO-DP shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations in the North Sea, 
are mainly related to failures of technical equipment applied onboard shuttle tankers for 
position-keeping purposes, as well as HOFs concerning the shuttle tanker DPO. Moreover, the 
barriers employed to mitigate the collision risk, are also mainly targeted at the aforementioned 
risks. Such barriers include among other alarms, DP system auto modes specifically designed 
for avoiding excessive motions between shuttle tanker and FPSO, as well as formal competence 
requirements for DPOs/station-keeping operators. 
Results from this thesis’ risk analysis revealed a decrease in the frequency (both absolute and 
per offloading) of incidents and collisions, during FPSO-shuttle tanker offloading operations 
on the UKCS & NCS, when comparing 1995-2003 versus 2004-2013. It was however not 
possible to observe any statistically significant reduction for neither the incident frequency, nor 
the collision frequency. Moreover, the collision frequency per year on the NCS is found to be 
more than two decades higher than the cut-off criterion for design loads, applicable to offshore 
installations on the NCS. 
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In terms of failure causes, there are found notable differences between the periods 1995-2003 
and 2004-2013. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the reduction in the failure causes ‘DP 
failure’ and ‘operator error’ indicates that there have been improvements to the DP system 
and/or DPO competence level. Furthermore, the results confirm earlier findings and contribute 
supplementary evidence that suggest that the loading phase is the most vulnerable part of the 
offloading operation. 
Several measures for reducing the collision frequency have been discussed, which addresses 
DPO competence level, time available for initiating recovery action, cooperation between the 
shuttle tanker and FPSO, and alternative field configurations. The collision frequency can be 
significantly reduced by applying direct offloading configuration instead of tandem offloading 
configuration. However, there are technical and operational issues that have to be resolved, 
before applying such a configuration to ship-shaped FPSOs. 
The work of this thesis contributes to existing knowledge about the collision risk in tandem 
offloading operations, in the North Sea, by providing updated incident and collision frequencies 
for the UKCS & NCS. Whilst this thesis did not demonstrate any statistically significant 
reduction for neither the incident frequency, nor the collision frequency, it provides an 
indication of the general direction for the frequency developments. Moreover, it suggests 
several measures for reducing the collision frequency, which can have a significant impact on 
the overall collision risk. The methods used in this thesis, to investigate the collision frequency 
in tandem offloading operations between DP shuttle tanker and FPSO in the North Sea, can be 
applied to investigate collision risk in similar operations elsewhere in the world. 
The findings of this thesis have some limitations. Firstly, the incident data only include DP 
shuttle tankers performing tandem offloading in the North Sea. Hence, the resulting frequencies 
are not directly applicable to similar operations elsewhere in the world. Secondly, the risk 
assessment did not consider consequences, nor the acceptability of current risk levels. Thirdly, 
the thesis’ investigation of incidents was limited by not having direct access to major incident 
databases; hence, it has not been possible to confirm if there are recorded incidents that have 
not been reported to governmental databases. 
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7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
In the course of working with this thesis, there have been identified issues that needs further 
work. 
The estimated frequencies for the UKCS, the NCS, as well as the UKCS & NCS aggregated, 
all indicate an increase for Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) in the period 2004-2013, compared 
to the period 1995-2003. In the thesis’ discussion, it is suggested that this could imply that the 
reduction in the collision frequency is due to an improved robustness in relation to the initiation 
of drive-off events, and that the issues relating to recovery actions remain unresolved. This 
hypothesis ought to be further investigated, as it is highly important to determine whether there 
is a need for addressing the recovery phase more strongly. 
This thesis has shown that the collision frequency has been reduced over the course of the last 
10 years. However, it has not been able to observe a statistically significant reduction for the 
frequency. As the estimated collision frequencies indicate that FPSO-DP shuttle tanker tandem 
offloading operations on the NCS do not meet the requirements of the Norwegian PSA, further 
work towards risk mitigation is necessary. This thesis proposed several measures for reducing 
the collision frequency, which should be considered implemented in operations. The topic of 
applying direct offloading configuration for ship-shaped FPSO, is found especially promising 
and should be explored in further research.
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APPENDIXES 
A1 – DEFINITIONS 
Table 14 shows selected risk terms and the associated definitions applied in this thesis, which 
are extracted from (Rausand, 2013) and (Vinnem et al., 2003b). 
Table 14: Risk terminology 
Term Description 
‘Accident’ An incurred event whose outcome is undesirable. 
‘Accident scenario’ A specific chain of events, leading from the initiating 
event to the undesirable outcome. If no barriers9 are in 
place, this can be a single event. 
‘Event’ Generally, an incidence that has a related outcome. An 
initial event may have numerous potential outcomes, 
whose severity also may vary. 
‘Frequency’ The rate of occurrence of an undesirable event. It is 
expressed as number of events per unit time, 
commonly per year. 
‘Harm’ Damage or physical injury to environment, property or 
health. 
‘Hazard’ Existing conditions that have the potential for 
resulting in an undesirable event. 
‘Hazardous event’ An event whose occurrence in turn initiates a sequence 
of events that ultimately leads to unwanted 
consequences to assets. Sometimes also termed 
accident initiating event, critical event, undesired 
event, or TOP event. 
‘Near-miss’ An incurred event whose outcome had potential for 
causing harm to assets, but did in fact not. The term 
may also be denoted as ‘precursors’ since such events 
are commonly hazardous events where safety barriers 
have prevented an accident. 
‘Resilience’ A system`s capability to absorb disturbances or shocks 
without suffering a catastrophic failure. 
‘Risk-influencing factor’ (RIF) A comparatively steady set of conditions that has an 
effect on the risk. RIFs can be classified as either 
consequence influencing or frequency influencing. 
‘Vulnerability’ A system`s incapability to withstand impacts of an 
undesirable event and restore its original state or 
function after the event. 
  
                                               
9 See section 3.2.4. 
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A2 – SHUTTLE TANKER BRIDGE LAYOUT 
 
Figure 45: Shuttle tanker bridge layout. (Chen, 2003) 
 
 
Table 15: Explanation to Figure 45 (Chen, 2003). 
a. Emergency key (engine and controller) j. Video screen of hawser winch 
b. Radar k. Video screen of tanker bow and FSU stern. 
c. Navigation board l. DP II console (Slave) 
d. Radar m. DP I console (Master) 
e. Artemis screen n. BLS console 
f. Blom PMS monitor o. ESD buttons 
g. DARPS I screen p. Loading/ballast console I 
h. DARPS II screen p. Loading/ballast console II 
i. Video screen of loading hose  
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III 
A3 – EXAMPLE OF THE PROCESS FOR A TANDEM OFFLOADING OPERATION IN 
THE NORTH SEA 
Table 16 presents an example of the process for a tandem offloading operation in the North 
Sea, adopted from (Chen, 2003, pp. 130-132). It is included to enlighten the reader on how 
tandem offloading operations are performed in practice. 
Table 16: The process for a tandem offloading operations in the North Sea (Chen, 2003). 
Time/Distance Operational Activities Phase 
3:30 am / 3 nm Due to dense fog, approach is postponed   
5:30 am / 4800 m ST begins approach towards FPSO  Approach phase starts 
FPSO heading 175° 
Total duration 1 h 20 min 
ST heading 272°, speed 15 kn 
Wind 18 kn, 280°, wave Hs 1,2 m 
2400 m ST speed 12 kn 
Contact from FPSO to ST 
1900 m ST speed 10 kn 
5:53 am / 1870 m Start DP manual 
ST speed 8,35 kn 
1718 m ST speed 3,2 kn 
1500 m ST 2,4 kn, heading 170° 
1000 m ST speed 2,5 kn, heading 166° 
6:18 am / 500 m ST speed 1,36 kn, heading 168° 
Contact from FPSO to ST 
350 m ST speed 0,56 kn, heading 172° 
294 m ST speed 0,39 kn, heading 176° 
233 m  ST speed 0,34 kn, heading 172° 
200 m ST asking FPSO to change heading to 180° 
6:33 am / 165 m Start DP Approach mode 
6:43 am / 118 m DP drop-out test 
6:50 am / 75 m Distance alarm setting, 3 m warning, 5 m alarm Connection phase starts 
75 m ST contacts FPSO 
Duration 1 h 46 min 
Ready for shooting messenger line 
7:00 am / 75 m FPSO shoots messenger line on ST 
7:15 am / 75 m Mooring connection, messenger line rolling 
7:20 am / 75 m Chain stopper is locked 
7:21 am / 75 m Start DP Weather vane mode. 
Take hawser tension input in DP reference input. 
7:30 am / 75 m DP Weather vane mode with ‘operator selected heading’.  
FPSO heading 182°, ST heading 193°.  
This is in order to facilitate hose connection operation. 
7:35 AM Hose connection completed. 
ST asks FPSO to change heading to 195°. 
7:45 AM Pump test, shutdown test. 
FPSO has initial problems with pump, problems are fixed 
8:05 AM ST gets no signal of receiving oil. 
New pump test initiated. 
Chief Officer takes over for the 1st Officer on the bridge. 
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Time/Distance Operational Activities Phase 
8:36 AM ST commences loading Loading phase starts 
FPSO 194°, ST 198°. 
Duration 11 h 24 min 
Environmental condition:  
Hs: 1,1 m, Current 2,5 m/s, Wind 9 kn. 
9:00 AM 2nd DARPS back to normal 
The position reference used:  
Artemis – position origin 
1st & 2nd DARPS – relative distance 
9:10 AM ST in loading 
FPSO 194°, ST 204° 
9:25 AM Captain leaves bridge. 
Chief Officer on DP watch. 
2nd Officer on the loading operation. 
12:45 PM FPSO 239°, ST 243° 
3:30 PM FPSO 314°, ST 315° 
4:00 PM Dense fog, unable to FPSO stern. 
Wind 16 kn. 
Loading continues. 
6:00 PM FSU 1°, ST 5° 
7:00 PM Loading stopped. 
Start to flush hose from FPSO. 
7:50 pm / 75 m Finish flushing hose. Disconnection phase starts 
Close coupler valve. 
Duration 21 min 
Close crude valve. 
8:00 PM Hose is dropped. 
Send back hose messenger line. 
8:11 PM Chain stopper is opened. 
Send back hawser, chain and messenger line. 
8:14 PM Begin DP Approach mode. Departure phase starts 
100 m set as point distance. 
Duration 11 min 
97,6 m FSU 11°, ST 35°. 
200 m Start DP manual 
8:25 PM All messenger line is sent back 
ST sails away. 
TOTAL   15 h 2 min 
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V 
A4 – GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS FOR TANDEM OFFLOADING OPERATIONS 
ON THE NCS 
The PSA are responsible for HSE regulations concerning petroleum activities on the NCS. 
Overall, the regulations are divided into five categories, framework regulations, management 
regulations, information duty regulations, facilities regulations, and activity regulations. Most 
of the regulations’ provisions are formulated as functional requirements, i.e. requirements to 
different characteristics, aspects or qualities, of the product, process or service. Along with the 
regulations, there is a set of guidelines providing recommendations for solutions to the 
requirements (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). 
In 2004, the PSA introduced the first regulations specifically targeted at preventing position 
incidents and collisions in shuttle tanker offloading operations on the NCS. However, 
definitions in the Petroleum Activities Act section 2 have implications for the regulations’ 
validity, i.e. ‘petroleum activity’ does not include transport of petroleum in bulk by ship, 
‘facility’ does not include ships transporting petroleum in bulk, but ‘production’ does include 
shipment of petroleum for ship transport. Subsequently, the aforementioned definitions make 
the PSA regulations only applicable for a shuttle tanker while it is inside the safety zone of the 
FPSO/FSU.  
The abovementioned PSA regulations were modified in 2010. Based on experience from shuttle 
tanker operations, the 2010 edition of the activity and facilities regulations contains several 
clarifications of the recommendations on issues ranging from equipment classes to various 
offloading systems (Kvitrud et al., 2012). 
Relevant to FPSO shuttle tanker tandem offloading operations:  
- The regulations require the shuttle tanker to be equipped with DP class 2. However 
although the guideline recommends the FPSO/FSU to be equipped with a DP system, 
there is no formal requirement for such.  
- Ship-shaped FPSOs/FSUs are required to know their own direction and position, as well 
as the direction and position of surrounding vessels and facilities, at all times. (Kvitrud 
et al., 2012) states that the text sounding in the guidance was made to ensure that the 
shuttle tanker`s position and movements can be monitored simultaneously by both the 
FPSO/FSU crew and the shuttle tanker crew, alerting both parties if the shuttle tanker 
has lost control of its position.  
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- If doing offloading operations without the use of mooring hawser, the shuttle tanker 
must have the capability of automatic offloading process shutdown if directional -or 
distance limits are exceeded, and there must be emergency shutdown valves installed 
on both shuttle tanker and FPSO/FSU. (Kvitrud et al., 2012) states that the text sounding 
was chosen to achieve the same level of safety in offloading operations, regardless of 
whether a mooring hawser is applied or not.  
- The FPSO/FSU must be able to withstand any load, accidental or natural, with a 
likelihood equal to or exceeding 1.0E-04 per year, without loss of its main safety 
functions. 
- If following the framework regulation Section 3, the FPSO/FSU must fulfil the 
Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) regulations as well as any complementary 
classification rules issued by Det Norske Veritas (DNV). E.g. in relation to collision 
impact energy and installation energy absorption capacity, Norwegian offshore 
structures must meet the collision design minimum criteria, which corresponds to an 
impact energy of 11 MJ for head-on collisions and 14 MJ for sideways collisions 
(Vinnem, 2013a). 
- NORSOK N-001 recommends for the shape of the FPSO/FSU stern to be rounded or 
partly rounded as it has been found that the collision energy absorbed by the FPSO, as 
well as the collision potential, is greatly reduced for slender stern designs (OLF, 2004). 
- During FPSO/FSU – shuttle tanker offloading operations, all other ship activities should 
be halted for the duration of the hydrocarbon transfer. (Kvitrud et al., 2012) states that 
the text is projected to mitigate the crew risk if a position incident should occur. 
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A5 – INFLUENCE DIAGRAM FOR COLLISION RISK BETWEEN ST AND FPSO 
 
Figure 46: Influence diagram for collision risk between shuttle tanker and FPSO (Vinnem et al., 2003b). 
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A6 – PRODUCTION AND OFFLOADING STATISTICS FOR FPSOS/FSUS ON THE 
UKCS & NCS 
Table 17: Annual and accumulated number of offloadings from FPSO/FSU, on the UKCS and the NCS, 1995-2013. 
Year 
UKCS NCS 
Annual number of 
offloadings 
Accumulated number 
of offloadings 
Annual number of 
offloadings 
Accumulated number 
of offloadings 
1995 72 72 0 0 
1996 98 170 8 8 
1997 164 335 19 27 
1998 290 625 83 110 
1999 394 1019 188 298 
2000 406 1425 355 654 
2001 430 1855 328 982 
2002 444 2299 278 1260 
2003 416 2715 273 1533 
2004 362 3077 277 1810 
2005 302 3379 267 2077 
2006 266 3644 246 2323 
2007 272 3916 203 2526 
2008 211 4127 209 2735 
2009 190 4317 225 2960 
2010 189 4507 218 3179 
2011 158 4665 188 3367 
2012 171 4836 169 3536 
2013 165 5001 165 3701 
 
Table 18: Production and offloading statistics for FPSOs/FSUs on the NCS, 1995-2013. 
FPSO Field 
Total Field 
production 
[Sm3*10^3] 
Total Field 
production 
[Tonnes*10^3] 
FPSO 
storage 
capacity 
[tonnes] 
Total 
number of 
loading 
operations 
Åsgard A FPSO Åsgard (oil) 84961 71349 121495 587 
Norne FPSO Norne 87761 73700 96128 767 
Alvheim FPSO 
Alvheim 23202 19485 74766 261 
Vilje 8709 7314 74766 98 
Voulund 6508 5465 74766 73 
Jotun A FPSO Jotun 22868 19204 78024 246 
Skrav FPSO Skarv 2140 1797 116822 15 
Balder FPSO Balder 57674 48433 50734 955 
Petrojarl Varg Varg 15511 13026 62750 208 
Njord B FSU Njord 25815 21679 92123 235 
Navion Saga FSU 
Volve 8205 6890 133511 52 
Yme (No longer producing) 7906 6639 133511 50 
Åsgard C FSU 
Åsgard (condensate) 17113 14371 115888 124 
Mikkel (condensate) 2229 1872 115888 16 
Kristin (condensate) 2097 1761 115888 15 
Total - 372699 312988 - 3701 
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Table 19: Production and offloading statistics for FPSOs/FSUs on the UKCS, 1995-2013. 
FPSO Field 
Total Field production 
[Tonnes*10^3] 
FPSO storage 
capacity 
[tonnes] 
Total number of 
loading operations 
Schiehallion FPSO SCHIEHALLION 46328 126836 365 
Petrojarl Foinaven FOINAVEN 49388 40053 1233 
ALBA FSU ALBA 57675 110147 524 
Emerald FSU Emerald 464 120160 4 
Liverpool Bay Osi 
LENNOX 13241 116155 114 
DOUGLAS 11706 116155 101 
Glas Dowr (OOP) 
DURWARD 907 88117 10 
DAUNTLESS 543 88117 6 
DONAN 833 88117 9 
Triton FPSO 
BITTERN 18122 84112 215 
GUILLEMOT W 3198 84112 38 
GUILLEMOT NW 945 84112 11 
Bleo Holm 
BLAKE 13115 117200 112 
ROSS 4327 117200 37 
Global Producer III 
BALLOCH 196 66756 3 
DUMBARTON 5167 66756 77 
LOCHRANZA 1376 66756 21 
LEADON (OOP) 2568 66756 38 
Petrojarl Banff BANFF 6714 16021 419 
North Sea Producer MACCULLOCH 15398 74766 206 
Haewene Brim PIERCE 14217 80107 177 
Anasuria 
TEAL 7522 113485 66 
TEAL SOUTH 967 113485 9 
GUILLEMOT A 5379 113485 47 
Captain FPSO CAPTAIN 41152 73431 560 
Gryphon A 
GRYPHON 16187 72096 225 
MACLURE 3941 72096 55 
TULLICH 3575 72096 50 
Maersk Curlew 
CURLEW 5796 74766 78 
CURLEW C 362 74766 5 
KYLE 2891 74766 39 
Aoka Mizu ETTRICK 2993 82642 36 
BW Athena ATHENA 737 6676 110 
Total  - 357930 - 5001 
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A7 – INCIDENT DATA 1995-2003 
Table 20: Number of incidents per operations phase, UKCS & NCS, 1995-2003. 
#No. incidents in each phase 
UKCS and NCS 
  
#No. incidents in each 
phase UKCS 
  
#No. incidents in each 
phase NCS   
Loading 14 Loading 10 Loading 4 
Disconnection 2 Disconnection 1 Disconnection 1 
Connection 2 Connection 1 Connection 1 
Approach 2 Approach 1 Approach 1 
Sum 20 Sum 13 Sum 7 
 
 
Figure 47: Number of accidents per operation phase, NCS 1995-2003. 
 
 
Figure 48: Number of accidents per operation phase, UKCS 1995-2003. 
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Table 21: Number of incidents per failure cause UKCS & NCS, 1995-2003. 
Failure cause UKCS and 
NCS 
  Failure cause UKCS   Failure cause NCS 
  
Black-out 0 Black-out 0 Black-out 0 
CPP failure 1 CPP failure 1 CPP failure 0 
DP failure 5 DP failure 2 DP failure 3 
Engine failure 1 Engine failure 1 Engine failure 0 
FPSO thrusters tripped 1 FPSO thrusters tripped 1 FPSO thrusters tripped 0 
Manually initiated drive off 1 Manually initiated drive off 0 Manually initiated drive off 1 
Operator error 4 Operator error 3 Operator error 1 
PRS failure 3 PRS failure 2 PRS failure 1 
Rapid wind change 1 Rapid wind change 1 Rapid wind change 0 
Technically initiated drive off 3 
Technically initiated drive 
off 2 
Technically initiated drive 
off 1 
Sum 20 Sum 13 Sum 7 
 
 
Figure 49: Distribution of incidents per failure cause, NCS 1995-2003. 
 
 
Figure 50: Distribution of incidents per failure cause, UKCS 1995-2003. 
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A8 – INCIDENT DATA 2004-2013 
Table 22: Number of incidents per operations phase, UKCS & NCS, 2004-2013. 
#No. incidents in each phase 
UKCS and NCS 
  
#No. incidents in each 
phase UKCS 
  
#No. incidents in each 
phase NCS   
Loading 5 Loading 0 Loading 5 
Disconnection 0 Disconnection 0 Disconnection 0 
Connection 2 Connection 0 Connection 2 
Approach 1 Approach 1 Approach 0 
Sum 8 Sum 1 Sum 7 
 
 
Figure 51: Distribution of incidents per operation phase, NCS 2004-2013. 
 
Figure 52: Distribution of incidents per operation phase, UKCS 2004-2013. 
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Table 23: Number of incidents per failure cause UKCS & NCS, 2004-2013.. 
Failure cause UKCS and NCS   Failure cause UKCS   Failure cause NCS   
Black-out 1 Black-out 0 Black-out 1 
CPP failure 1 CPP failure 0 CPP failure 1 
DP failure 1 DP failure 0 DP failure 1 
Engine failure 1 Engine failure 0 Engine failure 1 
FPSO thrusters tripped 0 FPSO thrusters tripped 0 FPSO thrusters tripped 0 
Manually initiated drive off 0 Manually initiated drive off 0 Manually initiated drive off 0 
Operator error 1 Operator error 0 Operator error 1 
PRS failure 2 PRS failure 1 PRS failure 1 
Rapid wind change 1 Rapid wind change 0 Rapid wind change 1 
Technically initiated drive off 0 Technically initiated drive off 0 Technically initiated drive off 0 
Sum 8 Sum 1 Sum 7 
 
 
Figure 53: Distribution of incidents per failure cause, NCS 2004-2013. 
 
 
Figure 54: Distribution of incidents per failure cause, UKCS 2004-2013. 
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A9 – INCIDENT DATA 1995-2013 
Table 24: Number of incidents per operations phase, UKCS & NCS, 1995-2013 
#No. incidents in each phase 
UKCS and NCS 
  
#No. incidents in each 
phase UKCS 
  
#No. incidents in each 
phase NCS   
Loading 19 Loading 10 Loading 9 
Disconnection 2 Disconnection 1 Disconnection 1 
Connection 4 Connection 1 Connection 3 
Approach 3 Approach 2 Approach 1 
Sum 28 Sum 14 Sum 14 
 
 
Figure 55: Distribution of incidents per operation phase, NCS 1995-2013. 
 
 
Figure 56: Distribution of incidents per operation phase, UKCS 1995-2013. 
 
64 %7 %
22 %
7 %
Distribution of accidents and incidents by operation phase, NCS
Loading Disconnection Connection Approach
72 %
7 %
7 %
14 %
Distribution of accidents and incidents by operation phase, UKCS
Loading Disconnection Connection Approach
Appendixes 
 
XV 
Table 25: Number of incidents per failure cause UKCS & NCS, 1995-2013. 
Failure cause UKCS and 
NCS 
  Failure cause UKCS   Failure cause NCS 
  
Black-out 1 Black-out 0 Black-out 1 
CPP failure 2 CPP failure 1 CPP failure 1 
DP failure 6 DP failure 2 DP failure 4 
Engine failure 2 Engine failure 1 Engine failure 1 
FPSO thrusters tripped 1 FPSO thrusters tripped 1 FPSO thrusters tripped 0 
Manually initiated drive off 1 Manually initiated drive off 0 Manually initiated drive off 1 
Operator error 5 Operator error 3 Operator error 2 
PRS failure 5 PRS failure 3 PRS failure 2 
Rapid wind change 2 Rapid wind change 1 Rapid wind change 1 
Technically initiated drive off 3 
Technically initiated drive 
off 2 
Technically initiated drive 
off 1 
Sum 28 Sum 14 Sum 14 
 
 
Figure 57: Distribution of incidents per failure cause, NCS 1995-2013. 
 
 
Figure 58: Distribution of incidents per failure cause, UKCS 1995-2013. 
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A10 – PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS 
Table 26: Probability calculations for selected time periods, UKCS & NCS. 
UKCS & NCS 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
Number of years 19 9 10 
Total number of incidents 28 20 8 
Total number of drive-offs 20 16 4 
Total number of collisions 7 5 2 
Incidents per year 1.47 2.22 0.80 
Collisions per year 0.37 0.56 0.20 
Total number of offloadings 8702 4248 4455 
Pr(Drive off) 0.00230 0.00377 0.00090 
Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) 0.35000 0.31250 0.50000 
Pr(collision) 0.00080 0.00118 0.00045 
 
Table 27: Probability calculations for selected time periods, UKCS. 
UKCS 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
Number of years 19 9 10 
Total number of incidents 14 13 1 
Total number of drive-offs 11 10 1 
Total number of collisions 5 4 1 
Incidents per year 0.74 1.44 0.10 
Collisions per year 0.26 0.44 0.10 
Total number of offloadings 5001 2715 2286 
Pr(Drive off) 0.00220 0.00368 0.00044 
Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) 0.45455 0.40000 1.00000 
Pr(collision) 0.00100 0.00147 0.00044 
 
Table 28: Probability calculations for selected time periods, NCS. 
NCS 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
Number of years 19 9 10 
Total number of incidents 14 7 7 
Total number of drive-offs 10 6 3 
Total number of collisions 2 1 1 
Incidents per year 0.74 0.78 0.70 
Collisions per year 0.11 0.11 0.10 
Total number of offloadings 3701 1533 2168 
Pr(Drive off) 0.00270 0.00391 0.00138 
Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) 0.20000 0.16667 0.33333 
Pr(collision) 0.00054 0.00065 0.00046 
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Table 29: Incident probabilities per year for the UKCS & NCS aggregated. Part 1. 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of years 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total number of incidents 0 1 3 2 4 5 
Total number of drive-offs 0 1 2 1 4 4 
Total number of collisions 0 1 2 1 0 1 
Incidents per year 0 1 3 2 4 5 
Collisions per year 0 1 2 1 0 1 
Total number of offloadings 72 106 184 373 582 762 
Pr(Drive off) 0 0.00948 0.01089 0.00268 0.00687 0.00525 
Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) 0 1 1 1 0 0.25 
Pr(collision) 0 0.00948 0.01089 0.00268 0 0.00131 
 
Table 30: Incident probabilities per year for the UKCS & NCS aggregated. Part 2. 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of years 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total number of incidents 2 2 1 1 0 1 
Total number of drive-offs 2 1 1 1 0 1 
Total number of collisions 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Incidents per year 2 2 1 1 0 1 
Collisions per year 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total number of offloadings 759 721 689 639 569 512 
Pr(Drive off) 0.00264 0.00139 0.00145 0.00156 0 0.00195 
Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Pr(collision) 0 0 0 0 0 0.00195 
 
Table 31: Incident probabilities per year for the UKCS & NCS aggregated. Part 3. 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of years 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total number of incidents 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 
Total number of drive-offs 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Total number of collisions 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Incidents per year 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 
Collisions per year 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total number of offloadings 475 421 415 408 346 340 330 
Pr(Drive off) 0 0 0.00482 0 0 0 0 
Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off) 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 
Pr(collision) 0 0 0.00241 0 0 0 0 
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A11 – TABLES AND FIGURES FOR COMPARISON OF INCIDENT DATA  
Table 32: Number of incidents, in selected time periods. 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 28 20 8 
UKCS 14 13 1 
NCS 14 7 7 
 
Table 33: Incident frequency per offloading, in selected time periods. 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 0.00322 0.00471 0.00180 
UKCS 0.00280 0.00479 0.00044 
NCS 0.00378 0.00457 0.00323 
 
 
Figure 59: Incident frequency per offloading, comparison chart. 
 
Table 34: Number of collisions, in selected time periods. 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 7 5 2 
UKCS 5 4 1 
NCS 2 1 1 
 
Table 35: Collision frequency per offloading, in selected time periods. 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 0.00080 0.00118 0.00045 
UKCS 0.00100 0.00147 0.00044 
NCS 0.00054 0.00065 0.00046 
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Figure 60: Collision frequency per offloading, comparison chart. 
 
Table 36: Drive-off frequency per offloading, in selected time periods. 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 0.00230 0.00377 0.00090 
UKCS 0.00220 0.00368 0.00044 
NCS 0.00391 0.00391 0.00138 
 
 
Figure 61: Drive-off frequency, comparison chart. 
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Table 37: Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off), in selected time periods 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 0.350 0.313 0.500 
UKCS 0.455 0.400 1.000 
NCS 0.200 0.167 0.333 
 
 
Figure 62: Pr(failure of recovery|drive-off), comparison chart. 
 
Table 38: Drive-off frequency per offloading in direct offloading configuration. 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 0.00153 0.00251 0.00060 
UKCS 0.00147 0.00246 0.00029 
NCS 0.00261 0.00261 0.00092 
 
Table 39: Collision frequency per offloading, in direct offloading configuration. 
Period 1995-2013 1995-2003 2004-2013 
UKCS & NCS 0.00015 0.00025 0.00006 
UKCS 0.00015 0.00025 0.00003 
NCS 0.00026 0.00026 0.00009 
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